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Abstract
Judgement aggregation is a model of social choice in which the space of social
alternatives is the set of consistent evaluations (‘views’) on a family of logically inter-
connected propositions, or yes/no-issues. Yet, simply complying with the majority
opinion in each issue often yields a logically inconsistent collection of judgements.
Thus, we consider the Condorcet set: the set of logically consistent views which
agree with the majority on a maximal set of issues. The elements of this set are
exactly those that can be obtained through sequential majority voting, according
to which issues are sequentially decided by simple majority unless earlier choices
logically force the opposite decision. We investigate the size and structure of the
Condorcet set —and hence the properties of sequential majority voting —for several
important classes of judgement aggregation problems. While the Condorcet set veri-
fies McKelvey’s (1979) celebrated ‘chaos theorem’ in a number of contexts, in others
it is shown to be very regular and well-behaved.
In the context of preference aggregation, pairwise majority voting often fails to produce
unambiguous outcomes because a Condorcet winner might not exist. Similarly, in the
general judgement aggregation problem where each social outcome is described as a pattern
∗We are grateful to an editor and a referee for their helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier
version of this work. We would also like to thank audiences at the Workshop of the Centre of Mathematical
Social Sciences at the University of Auckland, Tagung des Theoretischen Ausschusses des Vereins für
Socialpolitik in Günzburg, the OECD conference “New Directions in Welfare” in Paris, the Meeting of the
Society for Social Choice and Welfare in New Delhi, the COMSOC conference in Krakow, and of seminars
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of yes/no answers to certain interrelated propositions (a ‘view’), issue-wise majority voting
may fail to produce consistent collective ‘views,’ see Guilbaud (1952), Kornhauser and
Sager (1986). Consistency is guaranteed only in those cases in which the aggregation
problem has the structure of a median space, see Barthélémy and Monjardet (1981) and
Nehring and Puppe (2007).
Does this mean that the very idea of majoritarian aggregation is ill-defined in the general
case? Does ‘inconsistency’ imply ‘impossibility’? While this is a possible reading of the
Arrovian tradition in social theory, we submit that such a conclusion would be premature.
While no view may be canonically privileged as ‘uniquely majoritarian’ in these cases,
some views may still be ‘more majoritarian’ than others. We thus ask which views are
‘most majoritarian.’ As we shall see, this saves majoritarianism from impossibility, but at
the cost of indeterminacy.
As a novel solution to the problem of inconsistency of issue-wise majority voting, we
propose here the ‘Condorcet set’ and we argue that it serves as a natural demarcation
criterion for majoritarian decisions. A collection of yes/no answers to all propositions is
called a view; a view is consistent if it respects the logical interrelations between issues.
A consistent view is more representative than another consistent view if its judgement on
every issue is supported by at least as many voters, and on some issues by strictly more
voters. A consistent view is Condorcet admissible if there is no other consistent view that
is more representative. The set of such views is the Condorcet set. It is the set of all those
views that can count as majoritarian. In particular, the Condorcet set always coincides
with the issue-wise majority view whenever the latter is consistent.
The main goal of this paper is to investigate the properties of the Condorcet set,
considered as a solution concept for judgement aggregation. A focal question concerns
the size of the Condorcet set and thus the extent of majoritarian indeterminacy. We
show that, frequently, the Condorcet set can be large. In particular, we focus on the
question of when the Condorcet set at a given profile of individual views contains, for
every proposition, both a view that affirms that particular proposition and a view that
negates it. We refer to such profiles as globally indeterminate, and to aggregation problems
as globally indeterminate if they admit globally indeterminate profiles. As our main result,
we provide a general characterization of the set of indeterminate issues, with an attendant
characterization of globally indeterminate profiles and globally indeterminate spaces. We
then show that many interesting aggregation problems are indeed globally indeterminate,
among them the preference aggregation problem, the aggregation of equivalence relations,
resource allocation and many committee selections problems.
Majoritarian indeterminacy and, indeed, the full Condorcet set arises naturally from a
‘diachronic’ interpretation of the aggregation problem, in which decisions unfold over time
and previous decisions potentially restrict later decisions due to the logical interrelation
of propositions; a corresponding model of judgement aggregation has been studied by
List (2004) and Dietrich and List (2007). Here, we show that a consistent view (over
all issues) is an element of the Condorcet set if and only if there exists an ordering of
issues (a ‘path’) such that the given view arises from ‘sequential majority voting,’ i.e. from
deciding each issue by majority voting in the specified ordering provided that the issue
is not yet determined by previous decisions. The size of the Condorcet set reflects the
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potential extent of path-dependence. In particular, an aggregation problem exhibits path-
dependence at all whenever the Condorcet set has at least two elements, i.e. whenever
(simultaneous) issue-by-issue majority voting is inconsistent.
How likely is global indeterminacy? Is it just a theoretical ‘worst case,’ or can it happen
for plausible profiles? In the special case of preference aggregation, this question has been
addressed in a rather dramatic fashion in the classical contribution of McKelvey (1979).
Assuming a spatial structure of preferences on a topological space, McKelvey showed that,
for generic profiles, majority voting is not just inconsistent, it is globally indeterminate.
In this sense, global indeterminacy is almost bound to obtain.
With a finite set of alternatives, the dichotomy between consistency (hence complete
determinacy) and global indeterminacy cannot be as clear-cut, even in the case of pref-
erence aggregation, as in McKelvey’s continuous setting. We thus introduce a ‘McKelvey
property’ that is applicable to the finite case and meant to capture the idea that global
indeterminacies can arise from slight inconsistencies. Refining our main analysis of global
indeterminacy, we show that some important aggregation problems have the McKelvey
property, while others do not. The former include the preference aggregation and clas-
sification problems, the latter the committee selection and resource allocation problems.
Thus, committee selection and resource allocation problems provide significant examples
of spaces in which majority inconsistency is a problem, but a rather tame one. More
broadly, our analysis shows that the qualitative behavior of majoritarian judgment aggre-
gation strongly depends on the combinatorial structure of the space of feasible views.
Related Literature
The closest work to ours is the independent contribution by Lang et al. (2011) who intro-
duced and analyzed a number of set-valued solution concepts based on the common de-
nominator of ‘minimization,’ among them a solution concept equivalent to the Condorcet
set. There is, however, no overlap in results between their work and ours. In particular,
in contrast to their work, the present paper focuses on results supporting the Condorcet
set as the natural demarcation criterion for ‘majoritarian’ aggregation, and on an analysis
of indeterminacy, global indeterminacy, and path-dependence. Interestingly, even in the
context of preference aggregation, the Condorcet set characterized in Proposition 3.1 of
the present paper appears to be new in the literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In §1, we introduce terminology and define
the Condorcet set. In §2 we consider (global) indeterminacy and state our main results.
In §3, we explore indeterminacy and path-dependence in some paradigmatic judgement
aggregation problems: preference aggregation, the aggregation of equivalence relations,
committee selection and resource allocation. In the final §4 we consider the McKelvey
property and provide a classification of the examples in terms of this property. For ease of
reading, all but the simplest proofs are relegated to an appendix at the end of the paper.
1 ‘Majoritarian Views:’ A Minimalist Definition
In this section, we introduce our main new concept, the Condorcet set, and argue that it
captures a natural criterion for majoritarianism. We start with a brief description of the
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framework of our analysis, the judgement aggregation model.
1.1 The Judgment Aggregation Model
A judgement aggregation problem is given by a set of K propositions or issues. An element
x = (x1, x2, . . . , xK) ∈ {0, 1}K is called an unconstrained view, or simply a view, and is
interpreted as an assignment of a truth value of ‘true’ or ‘false’ to each proposition.1
Not all views are feasible, because there are logical constraints between the propositions
(determined by the structure of the underlying decision problem faced by society). Let
X ⊆ {0, 1}K be the set of ‘admissible’ or consistent views; a given set X ⊆ {0, 1}K is
also referred to as an aggregation space. An anonymous profile is a probability measure on
X —that is, a function µ : X−→[0, 1] such that
∑
x∈X µ(x) = 1 with the interpretation
that, for all x ∈ X, µ(x) is the proportion of the voters who hold the view x. For any
Y ⊆ X, define µ(Y ) :=
∑
y∈Y µ(y). Let ∆(X) be the set of all anonymous profiles. For
any µ ∈ ∆(X), any k ∈ [1...K], let
µk(1) := µ{x ∈ X ; xk = 1} (1)
be the total ‘popular support’ for the position “xk = 1,’ and let µk(0) := 1 − µk(1). Let
∆∗ (X) := {µ ∈ ∆(X); µk(1) 6= 12 , ∀k ∈ [1...K]} be the set of anonymous profiles where
there is a strict majority supporting either 0 or 1 in each coordinate.2 An anonymous
judgement aggregation rule is a correspondence (i.e. multivalued function) F : ∆∗ (X) ⇒
{0, 1}K . Most of the rules we will consider are single-valued, taking the form of a function
F : ∆∗ (X)−→{0, 1}K . For example, the issue-wise majoritarian judgement aggregation rule
Maj : ∆∗ (X)−→{0, 1}K is defined as follows: for any µ ∈ ∆∗ (X), Majk(µ) := 1 if µk(1) >
1
2
, and Majk(µ) := 0 if µk(1) <
1
2
. For any X, denote by Maj(X) := {Maj(µ) ; µ ∈ ∆∗ (X)}
the set of all possible issue-wise majority views.
Say that a profile µ is majority determinate if Maj(µ) ∈ X, and say that an aggregation
space X is majority determinate if all profiles µ ∈ ∆∗ (X) are majority determinate. Unfor-
tunately, it is quite common to find that Maj(µ) 6∈ X, i.e. there are in general profiles that
are not majority determinate, because the ‘majority ideal’ can be inconsistent with the
underlying logical constraints faced by society.3 What, in this case, should be considered
to be the ‘majority will’? This is the fundamental question to which we attempt to provide
an answer in the subsequent analysis. Before we do so, let us consider for future reference
a simple but fundamental special case, in which this problem does not arise.
1There are several different terms in the literature: e.g. Dokow and Holzman (2010) speak of ‘binary
evaluations,’ List and Puppe (2009) use the term ‘judgement set.’
2Usually, judgement aggregation is considered on all of ∆(X). However, a main goal in this paper
is to investigate the multiplicity of solutions in the Condorcet set of a single profile; for this goal it is
convenient to eliminate the ‘spurious’ multiplicities which arise when µk(1) =
1
2 for some k ∈ [1...K].
Thus, we will confine our attention to profiles in ∆∗ (X) for expositional simplicity. If the set of voters is
large (respectively odd), then a profile in ∆(X) \∆∗ (X) is highly unlikely (resp. impossible) anyways.
3Condorcet’s ‘voting paradox’ is a well-known instance, see Section 3.1 below; another example that
has received considerable interest recently is the so-called ‘discursive dilemma,’ see Kornhauser and Sager
(1986), List and Pettit (2002), and List and Puppe (2009) for an overview of the subsequent literature.
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Example 1.1 (The Line) Say that X is a linear aggregation problem, or simply a line,
if 0 := (0, 0, ..., 0) ∈ X and the issues [1...K] can be ordered in such a way that, for
every view x ∈ X \ {0} there exists kx ∈ [1...K] such that xj = 1 for j ≤ kx and
xj = 0 for j > kx. As is easily verified, Maj(µ) ∈ X for all µ in this case, i.e. X is
majority determinate. Indeed, if one identifies X with the set {0, 1, ..., K} by means of
the mapping x 7→ #{k ∈ [1...K] : xk = 1}, then Maj(µ) is given by the median in the
usual ordering of [1...K] (i.e. the view x ∈ X such that µ({y ∈ X : y ≥ x}) ≥ 1
2
and
µ({y ∈ X : y ≤ x}) ≥ 1
2
).4 Concrete examples of this linear structure are views on the
desirable inheritance tax rate, the maximal prison term served for a particular crime, the
term limit for representative of government officials, or the number of days within which
an abortion is legal.
Fig. 1 depicts a hypothetical case in which 20% of the population consider no inheritance
tax as desirable, 35% consider an inheritance tax rate of 0.1 desirable, and 45% consider













Figure 1: A linear aggregation problem
Evidently, the issue-wise majority view (i.e. the median) is at 0.1 (see Example 1.6 below
for further discussion). ♦
1.2 Demarcating Majoritarianism
How can we distinguish ‘majoritarian’ from ‘non-majoritarian’ aggregation rules? In this
subsection we propose two basic principles that capture important aspects of majority-
based group decisions. Let us start with simplest cases first, and consider the following
principle of ‘plain’ majoritarianism that one may impose on an aggregation rule F .
Plain Majoritarianism (PM) If µ(x) > 1
2
for some x ∈ X, then F (µ) = x.
If #X = 2, this is of course the ordinary (‘simple’) majority criterion, shown by May
(1952) to be the only neutral, anonymous and positively responsive aggregation method
in this case. Plain Majoritarianism has specific further implications. In particular, in
situations in which there are only two distinct views among the population, by PM, the
group view must coincide with the view of the greater number. Thus PM does not see
any need – or, more skeptically, does not leave any room – for compromise. While PM
is thus a strong and specific requirement that might be questioned under some normative
assumptions, we submit that it is a cogent expression of a basic intuition of a specifically
4Note that the median is unique due to our restriction to ∆∗ (X).
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majoritarian outlook as classically expressed, for example, by the 17th century political
philosopher Grotius according to whom “the majority would naturally have the right and
authority of the whole,” see (Risse, 2004, p.43). We thus take Plain Majoritarianism to
be a fundamental minimal condition for demarcating whether or not a group choice is to
be counted as majoritarian: by its very definition, a majority-based aggregation rule must
satisfy PM. Whether or not majoritarianism itself is normatively compelling as a standard
of group choice is a question that we do not address here. Indeed, our present goal is not
to normatively justify majoritarian principles of judgment aggregation and social choice,
but to determine the broad outlines of their content. For example, while the Borda rule
is often viewed as a normatively attractive voting or preference aggregation rule, there is
little question that it is not majoritarian in character. The justification of majoritarianism
is, ultimately, a matter of political philosophy and not undertaken here.5
To illustrate the strength of PM, consider the following class of metric-based aggregation
rules. Denote by dH the Hamming distance that takes the number of issues in which two
views differ as their distance, formally dH(x,y) := #{k ∈ [1...K] ; xk 6= yk} for all x,y ∈









This class of aggregation rules contains interesting and important special cases. For exam-
ple, as β → 0, the rule Fβ converges to the plurality rule, which selects the view(s) that
receive largest (relative) support. For β = 1, the rule Fβ selects the consistent view(s) that
minimize the average Hamming distance to the views of the voters. This is also known
as the median rule and we will write Median (X,µ) for F1(X,µ).
6 If X has the structure
of a line as in Example 1.1, i.e. if X is isomorphic to the set {1, 2, ...,#X} viewed as a
subset of the reals, then the Hamming distance coincides with the Euclidean distance and
the median rule indeed selects the median in the usual sense.
For β = 2, the aggregation rule Fβ selects the consistent view(s) that minimize the
average of the squared Euclidean distance to the views of the voters. In case of a line,
this amounts to the mean rule that selects (roughly) the average of the individual views.
Finally, as β →∞, Fβ converges to the rule that minimizes the maximal ‘disagreement’ of
any individual, selecting the midpoint(s) of the two most extreme views.
For any x,y, z ∈ {0, 1}K , say that y is between x and z if, for all k ∈ [1...K], (xk =
zk = 0) =⇒ (yk = 0) and (xk = zk = 1) =⇒ (yk = 1). Thus, a view is between two other
views if it coincides with them on all issues on which they agree. Furthermore, say that y
is properly between x and z if, in addition, x 6= y 6= z. For any x ∈ X and z ∈ {0, 1}K ,
5See Waldron (1999) for a prominent contemporary defense of majoritarianism, and Risse (2004) for a
critique well-informed by social choice theory. Baldiga (2012) discusses problems of majoritarian principles
in the context of direct vs. representative democracy.
6In the case of preference aggregation (see §3.1 below), the Hamming distance is also known as the
Kemeny distance, and the median rule as the Kemeny rule (Kemeny, 1959), which has been axiomatically
characterized by Young and Levenglick (1978). As a general-purpose judgement aggregation rule, the me-
dian rule has been studied by Barthélémy and Monjardet (1981, 1988), Barthélémy (1989) and Barthélémy
and Janowitz (1991).
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write x  z if there exists no y ∈ X which is properly between x and z. Finally, say that
X is regular if there are three views x, y and z in X such that y is properly between x and
z.
Proposition 1.2 If X is regular, then Fβ satisfies PM if and only if β ≤ 1
Note that condition Plain Majoritarianism does not use in any way the propositional
structure of the underlying space X. But with this structure one can formulate stronger
criteria for majority decisions. The following is particularly natural.
Condorcet Consistency (CC) If Maj(µ) ∈ X, then F (µ) = Maj(µ).
Clearly, condition CC implies PM but it can be decisive in many cases in which PM
has no bite. If the underlying space is majority determinate, then condition CC is even
decisive for all profiles. The additional force of CC over PM is evident from the following
result which characterizes the metric-based aggregation rules that satisfy CC.
Proposition 1.3 If X is regular, then Fβ satisfies CC if and only if β = 1
Thus, the median rule is in fact the only metric-based aggregation rule that satisfies
CC. In particular, in regular spaces, plurality rule (i.e.limβ↘0 Fβ) does not satisfy condition
CC, and can on these grounds not be counted as a majoritarian aggregation rule.7
1.3 Condorcet admissibility and the Condorcet Set
Recall that µk(1) (resp. µk(0)) denotes the popular support for position 1 (resp. 0) in issue
k at the profile µ. Thus, for every view x ∈ X, µk(xk) is the popular support for the
position specified by x in issue k. Say that view x is more representative of µ than view y,
denoted by xR(µ)y, if it receives greater popular support in every issue. Formally,
xR(µ)y :⇔ [µk(xk) ≥ µk(yk) for all k ∈ K] . (3)
We propose a conception of majoritarianism according to which more representative views
are more majoritarian. In this paper, we explore the minimalist or broad-tent formulation
of this conception which relies only on R(µ) as yardstick of comparative representativeness.
Then the R(µ)-maximal views can be considered to be the ‘most majoritarian.’ Henceforth,
we will thus refer to the R(µ)-maximal views as the Condorcet admissible views, and to their
set as the Condorcet set, denoted by Cond (X,µ).
While the relation R(µ) is motivated in terms of comparative representativeness, we do
not claim here that R(µ) represents the only possible formalization of ordinary intuitions
and usages of ‘representativeness.’ Special – and crucial – to the relation R(µ) is the vector
comparison reflecting a ‘multi-criteria’ conception of representativeness, the criteria being
the alignment of a view with the distribution of individual judgements in each issue. As
demonstrated by the following results, it is this multi-criteria structure which ensures that
7Plurality rule does satisfy condition CC in some non-regular spaces, for instance in the space X =
{(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1)}, and more generally, in the spaces Xcom1,1;K introduced in §3.3 below.
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‘most representative’ views can indeed count as majoritarian. In particular, by Lemma
1.5 below, Condorcet admissibility ensures Condorcet Consistency and, a fortiori, Plain
Majoritarianism.8
Note that our definition of comparative representativeness allows for the full quantita-
tive information entailed by a profile to be useable a priori. However, it turns out that
the relation R(µ) is completely determined by the set of issues in which there is agreement
with Maj(µ). Specifically, we have the following simple result.
Lemma 1.4 Let µ ∈ ∆∗ (X). For x ∈ X, let M(x, µ) := {k ∈ [1...K]; xk = Majk(µ)} be
the set of issues in which x coincides with the ‘majority ideal.’ Then,
xR(µ)y ⇔ M(x, µ) ⊇M(y, µ).
In particular, a view is Condorcet admissible if and only if it coincides with the ‘majority
ideal’ on a maximal subset of issues.
Condorcet admissibility is proposed here as a necessary and sufficient condition for
‘majoritarianism’ in the sense that, for any given profile, a view can be counted as majori-
tarian if and only if it is an element of the Condorcet set. The necessity part of this claim
follows almost by definition: a decision cannot plausibly be viewed as majority-based if it
is possible to increase the popular support on an issue without decreasing it on any other
issue. Equivalently, by Lemma 1.4, a decision cannot be counted as ‘majoritarian’ if it is
possible to respect the majority view on a strictly larger set of issues. Moreover, Lemma
1.5 below characterizes the Condorcet admissible views as ‘best approximations’ to the ma-
jority ideal.9 The sufficiency of Condorcet admissibility as a criterion of majoritarianism
is supported by the characterizations entailed by Propositions 1.7 and 1.8 below, either of
which shows that every Condorcet admissible view has strong majoritarian credentials.
The following lemma yields a simple but fundamental characterization of the Condorcet
set as the set of views that are ‘best approximations’ to the majority ideal; recall that x  y
if no view is properly between x and y (x is ‘adjacent’ to y).
Lemma 1.5 (a) If Maj(µ) ∈ X, then Cond (X,µ) = {Maj(µ)}.
(b) Otherwise, Cond (X,µ) = {x ∈ X ; x  Maj(µ)}.
In this case, |Cond (X,µ) | ≥ 3.
8One might consider, alternatively, employing a metric approach on which the representativeness of
a view is measured by the average (transformed) distance from the individual views. As illustrated by
the discussion of transforms of the Hamming distance above, unless the minimand is the untransformed
average Hamming distance, the most representative views will not be Condorcet Consistent, cf. Proposi-
tion 1.3. Thus, whatever their merit, such approaches cannot serve as alternative routes to articulating
majoritarianism in judgment aggregation.
9Lang et al. (2011) define their version of the Condorcet set in terms of the majority ideal. We think
of this as less attractive, as it uses majoritarian intuitions on the right-hand side, and a priori rules out
the use of quantitative information.
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Example 1.6 (The Median vs. the Mean in the Line) Consider again the line,
identified with the set {0, 1, ..., K} as in Example 1.1, so that the view 0 corresponds to
the rejection of all issues, and every view k ≥ 1 corresponds to the affirmation of exactly the
issues ≤ k. Let K ≥ 3, and suppose that under the profile µ, the view 0 is supported by two
agents, while each of the views K−2, K−1 and K is supported by one agent, respectively.
Then, in accordance with Lemma 1.5, Maj(µ) = K − 2 (the ‘median’ view) is the single
most representative view. Indeed, it receives a uniform 3/5-majority on each issue; any
other feasible view looses against a majority on some issue, and no view reaches a larger
majority on any issue. In particular, the median view K − 2 is more representative than
the ‘mean view,’ i.e. the view closest to the average of the individual views (= (3K−3)/5)
whenever K ≥ 5. Note that the median view is also more representative than the ‘plurality
view’ 0 (the single view supported by the largest fraction of agents).
In some settings, the line is only defined qualitatively in terms of the implied betweenness
relation among views, for example, if views are ordered in terms of some right to left
spectrum of political values. In those cases, a mean may be formally defined but will
hinge on an arbitrary cardinalization of distances. But even in settings in which the line
represents a (discrete) quantity, there may exist other scales that could be viewed as equally
or more appropriate as a basis for averaging. For instance, the value of the mean in Fig.1
above (at 0.26) depends on the chosen scale in terms of (absolute) levels of the tax rate.
By contrast, the median (at 0.1) is invariant with respect to the choice of the scale. From
the perspective of representing the ‘people’s will,’ the median has thus greater appeal in
this example than the mean; clearly, it also has much greater appeal than the ‘plurality
view’ (at 0.5). ♦
An aggregation rule F : ∆∗ (X) ⇒ {0, 1}K is called Condorcet admissible if F (µ) ⊆
Cond (X,µ) for any X and µ. A natural class of Condorcet admissible rules arises in the







−→R, assumed to be non-decreasing
and odd (i.e. φ(r) = −φ(−r)) with φ(r) < 0 for all r < 0 and φ(r) > 0 for all r > 0. For
any such function, and strictly positive weights λk > 0 with
∑
k∈[1...K] λk = 1, define the
weighted additive majority rule Fφ,λ : ∆





λk · φ[µk(xk)− 12 ]. (4)







and λk = 1/K for all k, then Fφ,λ is the
Slater rule:




k ∈ [1...K] ; µk(xk) > 12
}
. (5)
The Slater rule selects the consistent views that maximize the number of issues in which
there is agreement with the majority will.10 This rule was first suggested by Slater (1961)
in the setting of Arrovian preference aggregation, in which it selects the transitive orderings
that agree with the majority tournament in the largest number of binary comparisons.
10It is also easily verified that Slater (X,µ) = argminx∈X dH [x,Maj(µ)]; that is, the Slater rule selects
the consistent view(s) that minimize the Hamming distance to the issue-wise majority view.
9







and λk = 1/K
for all k then the corresponding Fφ,λ coincides with the median rule defined above, i.e.





This alternative representation of the median rule underlines its importance in the theory
of aggregation. More generally, the following result establishes a close connection between
the class of weighted additive majority rules and Condorcet admissibility.
Proposition 1.7 Any weighted additive majority rule Fφ,λ is Condorcet admissible. Con-
versely, for any µ ∈ ∆∗ (X), any x ∈ Cond (X,µ), and any gain function φ, there exist
weights λk > 0 such that Fφ,λ(µ) = {x}.
1.4 A Diachronic Interpretation: Sequential Majority Voting
Condorcet admissibility is closely related to ‘sequential’ majority voting, according to which
issues are decided sequentially by simple majority unless previous decisions force the oppo-
site choice. Specifically, we show now that a view x is Condorcet admissible if and only if
there exists a sequence of issues (‘a path’) γ such that x is the result of sequential majority
voting along the path γ. From an applied viewpoint, this ‘diachronic’ perspective on the
judgement aggregation problem is important since, in reality, many social decisions are
made in a piecemeal fashion, with different aspects decided at different times.
For any y = (yk)
K
k=1 ∈ {0, 1}K and J ⊂ [1...K], define yJ := (yj)j∈J ∈ {0, 1}J . For any
i ∈ [1...K] \J , say that yi is X-consistent with yJ if there exists some x ∈ X with xJ = yJ
and xi = yi —otherwise yi is X-inconsistent with yJ . A path through [1...K] is a bijection
γ : [1...K]−→[1...K]. We now define the γ-sequential majority rule F γ : ∆∗ (X)−→X. Let
µ ∈ ∆∗ (X) and let z := Maj(µ). Define y := F γ(µ) ∈ X inductively as follows:
• Define yγ(1) := zγ(1).
• Inductively, let J := {γ(1), γ(2), . . . , γ(n)}, and suppose we have already decided yJ .
Let i := γ(n + 1). If zi is X-consistent with yJ , then set yi := zi. Otherwise, set
yi = ¬zi.11
A key issue in the context of sequential majority voting is path-dependence (List, 2004;
Dietrich and List, 2007). Say that the profile µ is path-dependent if there exist paths γ
and ξ such that F γ(µ) 6= F ξ(µ). Our next result establishes that the Condorcet admissible
views are exactly those that can be obtained as the result of sequential majority voting:
Proposition 1.8 Let X ⊆ {0, 1}K.
(a) For any path γ through [1...K], the rule F γ is Condorcet admissible.
(b) Conversely, for any µ ∈ ∆∗ (X) and x ∈ Cond (X,µ), there exists a path γ such
that F γ(µ) = x.
11“¬” represents logical negation. That is: ¬1 := 0 and ¬0 := 1.
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This result can be viewed as a judgement aggregation counterpart to a well-known
characterization of the top cycle as the outcome of non-strategic voting in simple binary
tree agendas due to Miller (1977). Propositions 1.7 and 1.8 lend support to our argument
for the sufficiency of Condorcet admissibility as a criterion of majoritarian decisions, since
either result shows that every Condorcet admissible view is supportable by rules with
unquestionable majoritarian credentials.12
There are two different interpretations of how the decision paths emerge in the di-
achronic model, the ‘contingency’ and the ‘design’ interpretation. Under the former, the
path is exogenously given, or chosen by history; in this case, the ‘size’ of the Condorcet
set, i.e. the extent of path-dependence, measures the role of historical accident. Under the
latter, the path is chosen by an agenda setter and the Condorcet set can be viewed as her
option set, given the constraint of using simple majority voting in each single step of the
decision sequence. In this case, the size of the Condorcet set measures the extent to which
the agenda setter can manipulate the final outcome.
Under either interpretation, an important task is provide quantitative measures of ‘size’
and the implied extent of path-dependence and indeterminacy. This is indeed the central
aim of our analysis in Section 2 below. For comparison, we conclude our exposition of the
general model with a characterization of the spaces in which there is no path-dependence,
and thus also no indeterminacy.
A profile µ ∈ ∆∗ (X) is path-independent if F γ(µ) = F ξ(µ) for any two paths γ and ξ
through [1...K]. The space X itself is called path-independent if every µ ∈ ∆∗ (X) is path-
independent. Let J ⊆ [1...K] and consider w ∈ {0, 1}J which corresponds to a subset of
judgements on the issues in J . The set J is the support of w, denoted supp (w). We define
the order of w as #w := #J . If I ⊆ J and v ∈ {0, 1}I , then we say v is a fragment of w (and
write v v w) if v = wI . Furthermore, w is a forbidden fragment for X if, for all x ∈ X, we
have xJ 6= w. Finally, w is a critical fragment if it is a ‘minimal’ forbidden fragment —that
is, w is forbidden, and there exists no proper subfragment v < w such that v is forbidden.
Let W (X) be the set of critical fragments for X and let κ(X) := max {#w ; w ∈ W (X)},
thus κ(X) is maximal order of a critical fragment for X.
A particular role is played by spaces X ⊆ {0, 1}K for which κ(X) = 2; these are
known as median spaces in combinatorial mathematics. Their importance in the theory of
aggregation has been emphasized by Barthélémy and Monjardet (1981) and Nehring and
Puppe (2007, 2010). Note that a set of feasible views X is a median space if and only if
all logical interrelations are confined to simple implications: for some j, k and all x ∈ X,
xj = 0 implies that xk = 0, or xj = 0 implies that xk = 1. The simplest example of a
median space is the line considered in Example 1.1 above.
Proposition 1.9 Let X ⊆ {0, 1}K. The following statements are equivalent: [i] X is
path-independent; [ii] X is majority determinate; [iii] X is a median space, i.e. κ(X) = 2.
12Note that we do not claim that all Condorcet admissible views for a given profile are equally satisfactory
from a normative point of view. To the contrary, in many cases there can be additional considerations
that, while not entailed by majoritarianism per se, privilege some Condorcet admissible views over others,
see Nehring and Pivato (2012).
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1.5 Indeterminacy and Path-Dependence
By Proposition 1.9, the Condorcet set does not determine a unique collective view in most
cases, and by Lemma 1.5 it then consists of at least three elements. In particular, in
these cases there exist issues that are indeterminate in the sense that either answer in
these issues is compatible with Condorcet admissibility. Accordingly, for X ⊆ {0, 1}K and
µ ∈ ∆∗ (X), say that issue k ∈ [1...K] is indeterminate if there exist x,y ∈ Cond (X,µ)
such that xk 6= yk. We denote the set of all indeterminate issues at µ by Indet(µ). Thus,
Indet(µ) is the set of issues in which either answer is compatible with the principle of
majoritarianism as embodied in the notion of Condorcet admissibility. Diachronically
speaking, Indet(µ) = {k ∈ [1...K]; there exist paths γ and ζ such that F γk (µ) 6= F
ζ
k (µ)}
(by Proposition 1.8). The issues in [1...K] \ Indet(µ) are called the determinate issues.
Finally, we say that µ is globally indeterminate if Indet(µ) = [1...K], and we say that X is
globally indeterminate if there exists some globally indeterminate µ ∈ ∆∗ (X).
We turn now to our main results, the general characterizations of indeterminacy and
global indeterminacy for all aggregation spaces.
2 Indeterminacy and Global Indeterminacy:
A General Characterization
Consider any unconstrained view x ∈ {0, 1}K and any aggregation space X ⊆ {0, 1}K . Say
that x activates the critical fragment w if x coincides with w on its support, i.e. xsupp(w) =
w. Furthermore, say that x activates issue k if it activates some critical fragment w such
that k ∈ supp (w). Lastly, say that the profile µ activates a critical fragment, respectively
an issue, if the corresponding issue-wise majority view Maj(µ) does.
Theorem 2.1 Let X ⊆ {0, 1}K be any aggregation space and let µ ∈ ∆∗ (X) be any profile.
Then issue k is indeterminate if and only if k is activated by µ.
The proof of Theorem 2.1 in the appendix proceeds as follows. If an issue k is indeter-
minate, then there exist Condorcet admissible views x and y such that xk 6= yk. One of
these views, say x, must disagree with the majority view on issue k. Proposition 1.8 says
that there is some path ζ such that F ζ(µ) = x. Through an inductive construction, we
show that F ζ(µ) disagrees with the majority view on issue k if and only if the majority
view contains a critical fragment which involves issue k, and such that ζ encounters (and
F ζ(µ) agrees with) every other issue of this critical fragment before ζ reaches k, and is
thus forced to disagree with the majority on issue k (see Proposition A.4 in the appendix).
This implies that every indeterminate issue is involved in some critical fragment activated
by µ. Conversely, given any critical fragment activated by µ, and any issue k involved in
that fragment, we can construct a path ζ which traverses the rest of the critical fragment
before reaching k, and thus must contradict the majority view in k. This shows that k is
indeterminate.
Theorem 2.1 yields a simple combinatorial characterization of globally indeterminate
profiles and spaces, as follows. Say that an unconstrained view x is critical for X if x
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activates every issue in [1...K], and denote the set of all views that are critical for X by
Crit(X).
Theorem 2.2 Let X ⊆ {0, 1}K.
(a) For any µ ∈ ∆∗ (X),
(













Maj(X) ∩ Crit(X) 6= ∅
)
.
Proof: (a) follows immediately from Theorem 2.1, and (b) follows from (a). 2
Thus, a profile is globally indeterminate if and only if the majority ideal point at this
profile is critical for X, and the space X itself is globally indeterminate if and only if
it gives rise to a majority ideal point that is critical for X. For detailed illustration in
paradigmatic applications, see Section 3 below.
To apply Theorem 2.2(b) to show that a space X is globally indeterminate, one needs
to find an unconstrained view that is critical for X and that is the issue-wise majority view
for some profile µ on X. To determine whether such a profile exists, for any given view,
may be difficult in general, hence Theorem 2.2 may be difficult to apply. However, in a
significant number of cases, the McGarvey spaces, this problem does not arise, as these
spaces are defined by the property that Maj(X) = X; see Nehring and Pivato (2011) for a
detailed analysis and numerous examples, including the spaces XprN and X
eq
N corresponding
to preference aggregation and the classification problem (see Sections 3.1 and 3.2 below).
Theorem 2.1 also entails a characterization of when no issue is indeterminate given a
profile, i.e. of when issue-wise majority voting is consistent for a given profile.
Corollary 2.3 The profile µ is majority determinate if and only if µ does not activate
any critical fragment.
The question of majority determinacy of a given profile in an arbitrary aggregation space
has been addressed before by Dietrich and List (2010) and Pivato (2009). The condition
derived in Corollary 2.3 readily translates into Dietrich and List’s (2010) condition of
‘majority consistency.’ Dietrich and List (2010) also provide a number of other, simpler
but only sufficient conditions for majority determinacy of a given profile, among them
the counterpart in the general judgement aggregation model of Sen’s classical condition of
‘value restriction’ (see Sen (1970)). Pivato (2009) provides a class of sufficient geometric
conditions for determinacy of a profile.
Theorem 2.1 also yields via Corollary 2.3 the characterization of majority determinate
spaces as median spaces stated in Proposition 1.9. This follows from the observation that
a critical fragment w of X is activated by some profile µ ∈ ∆∗ (X) if and only if #w ≥ 3.
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3 The Condorcet Set in Paradigmatic Aggregation
Problems
In this section we will illustrate the notions of Condorcet admissibility and Condorcet
set in four paradigmatic examples: preference aggregation, the aggregation of equivalence
relations (the “classification problem”), committee selection and the allocation of public
goods.
3.1 Preference aggregation
Consider a finite set of N social alternatives. Let K := N(N − 1)/2, and bijectively
identify [1...K] with a subset of [1...N ] × [1...N ] which contains exactly one element of
the set {(a, b), (b, a)} for each distinct a, b ∈ [1...N ]. Then {0, 1}K represents the space of
all tournaments (i.e. complete, irreflexive, antisymmetric binary relations, or equivalently,
complete directed graphs) on [1...N ]. Intuitively, each issue corresponds to a proposition of
the form ‘alternative a is strictly preferred to alternative b.’13 Let XprN ⊂ {0, 1}K be the set
of all tournaments representing total orderings (i.e.permutations) of [1...N ] (sometimes XprN
is called the permutahedron). Classical Arrovian aggregation of strict preference orderings
is simply judgement aggregation on XprN . For any profile µ ∈ ∆∗(X
pr
N ), the set Cond (X
pr
N , µ)
is the set of preference orderings on [1...N ] such that no other ordering agrees with the
µ-majority on a larger set of pairwise comparisons.
Note that in the case of preference aggregation, Condorcet admissibility always restricts
the set of admissible elements, i.e. Cond (XprN , µ) is never all of X
pr
N . For example, if a
majority of voters strictly prefer a to b in the profile µ, then no element of Cond (XprN , µ)
can place a and b as nearest neighbours with b  a, because switching the social ranking
between a and b while retaining all other comparisons would agree with the majority view
on a strictly larger set of issues.14 In particular, the top-ranked alternative of a Condorcet
admissible ordering is always preferred by a majority to the second-ranked alternative.
Thus, in any Condorcet admissible ordering, the top alternatives is the majority winner in
a runoff with the top two choices.
Observe also that majority determinacy in the sense defined above is stronger than
the usual notion of existence of a Condorcet winner. Indeed, majority determinacy in our
sense requires the existence of an entire ordering that agrees with the majority judgement
in each binary comparison; it is thus equivalent to the existence of a Condorcet winner on
each subset of [1...N ].
For any x ∈ {0, 1}K , let
x
 be the binary relation on [1...N ] defined by x. Moreover, for
any µ ∈ ∆∗ (XprN ), let
µ
 be the binary relation defined by Maj(µ) —the so-called majority
tournament. An element y ∈ XprN is called a directed Hamiltonian chain of Maj(µ) if all
nearest-neighbour comparisons in
y
 agree with the orderings specified by
µ
. In other
13The focus on strict orderings is for expositional convenience here. The analysis can be generalized
without difficulty to the case of binary relations with non-trivial indifferences; in that case, one needs to
introduce both issues (a, b) (corresponding to ‘a  b’) and (b, a) (corresponding to ‘b  a’), see Nehring
et al. (2013) for a corresponding model.
14a  b is a nearest-neighbour comparison if for all c with a  c and c  b either c = a or c = b.
14
words, if we represent
y
 as a linear directed graph C and represent
µ
 as a complete
directed graph D in the obvious way, then C is a (directed) subgraph of D.
Let
x
∗ be the transitive closure of
x
,15 augmented by all pairs (a, a) for a ∈ [1...N ];
then
x




∗ is an equivalence relation (one has a
x









∗ (one has a
x
∗ b iff ‘a is on a lower
x
-cycle than b’). The maximal
x
≈∗-equivalence
class is also known as the top cycle of the tournament defined by x.16
Proposition 3.1 Let µ ∈ ∆∗(XprN ).




 is a directed Hamiltonian chain in
µ
}.
(b) For all a, b ∈ [1...N ], a
µ
∗ b if and only if, for all x ∈ Cond (XprN , µ), a
x
 b. In
particular, the determinate issues given a profile µ are exactly the issues (a, b) for
which either a
µ
∗ b, or b
µ
∗ a.
(c) The profile µ is globally indeterminate if and only if the top cycle of
µ
 equals
[1...N ]. (Such profiles exist.)
While directed Hamiltonian chains are a well-known object in combinatorics, their
characterization in Proposition 3.1(a) appears to be new in the social choice literature.
Note also that, by Proposition 3.1(b), for every profile µ, the top cycle set of the majority
tournament consists exactly of the top elements of the Condorcet admissible orderings.
Example 3.2 (Condorcet Set in the 4-permutahedron) Consider XprN with the set
of alternatives N = {a, b, c, d}. Suppose that one third of the population endorses each
of the preference orderings a  b  c  d, b  c  d  a and c  d  a  b. For













 d (see Fig. 2). By Proposition 3.1(a), the Condorect set consists of the following five
orderings: a  b  c  d, b  c  d  a, c  d  a  b, d  a  b  c, c  a  b  d.
The global indeterminacy of the considered profile follows from Proposition 3.1(c).
♦
By Proposition 3.1(b), the top cycle set of a majority tournament characterizes the
choice implications of ‘majoritarian’ preference aggregation: an alternative is in the top
cycle if and only if it is on top of some Condorcet admissible ordering. While choice
from the top cycle of the underlying majority tournament is thus a necessary condition for
Condorcet admissibility, it is by no means sufficient. Indeed, as already noted, Condorcet
admissibility entails additional restrictions that do not only concern the top elements. The
following example provides a further illustration.
15By definition, the pair (a, b) belongs to the transitive closure of  if there exist a1, ..., am such that
a = a1, b = am and aj  aj+1 for all j = 1, ...,m− 1.
16The concept of the top cycle was introduced by Good (1971), see also (Moulin, 1988, p.253). For a
choice-theoretic analysis of the relation
x














Figure 2: A majority tournament on four alternatives
Example 3.3 (The ‘Fairest Vote of All’) The Copeland rule ranks each alternative
according to the number of alternatives which it beats in pairwise majority comparisons,
and selects the alternative(s) with the largest such number. For instance, in Fig. 2, the
alternatives b and c each receive a ‘Copeland score’ of 2, while a and d receive a score
of 1; thus, the ‘Copeland winners’ are b and c. Evidently, the Copeland rule chooses a
Condorcet winner whenever it exists. As seen from this simple example, however, the
Copeland rule often produces ties. To solve this problem, Dasgupta and Maskin (2004)
have proposed the following refinement of the Copeland rule under the name of the ‘fairest
vote of all.’17 First, order alternatives according to their Copeland score; if this yields a
tie between two or more alternatives, order those according to their Borda scores while
retaining the lexicographic precedence of the Copeland score among the other alternatives
(note that the Borda rule generically yields a strict ranking of alternatives). Evidently, the
resulting voting rule chooses from the top cycle; however, it does in general not produce
a Condorcet admissible ranking. For instance, for the profile in Example 3.2 it yields
the unique ordering c  b  a  d which is not Condorcet admissible because in the
case of both nearest-neighbour pairs (c, b) and (a, d) a majority prefers the lower ranked
alternative. We thus conclude that the method proposed by Dasgupta and Maskin is not
‘genuinely’ majoritarian; this makes intuitive sense, since the invocation of Borda count
introduces prima facie non-majoritarian considerations. ♦
3.2 Classification
An interesting example of judgement aggregation frequently discussed in the literature is
the ‘classification problem,’ i.e. the problem of aggregating a set of equivalence relations
(see Fishburn and Rubinstein (1986) and, for a recent contribution, Dimitrov et al. (2012)).
The individual equivalence relations correspond to the classifications of a set of objects by
different experts. The experts disagree about the appropriate classification into equivalence
classes, and the problem consists in finding an overall classification that best represents
their view as a group.
Formally, let N ∈ N, let K := N(N − 1)/2, and identify [1...K] with a subset of
[1...N ]× [1...N ] containing exactly one of the pairs (a, b) or (b, a) for each a 6= b ∈ [1...N ].
17Originally, Dasgupta and Maskin (2004) proposed it as a voting rule, i.e. an aggregation method
that specifies only a chosen alternative given any profile of individual preferences; we present here the
straightforward extension of Dasgupta’s and Maskin’s method to a preference aggregation rule.
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Thus, an element of {0, 1}K may represent a symmetric, reflexive binary relation, i.e. an
undirected graph on [1...N ]. By XeqN ⊆ {0, 1}K we denote the set of all equivalence relations
on [1...N ]. The equivalence relation represented by x ∈ XeqN will be denoted by
x∼; moreover,
for any graph x ∈ {0, 1}K denote by tr(x) its transitive closure. The graph 1 is called the
complete graph; x is called connected if tr(x) = 1. The following result characterizes the
Condorcet set and the determinate issues for every profile in the classification problem.
Proposition 3.4 Let µ ∈ ∆∗(XeqN ), and let xµ ∈ {0, 1}K be the issue-wise majority judge-
ment (the ‘majority graph’).
(a) Let x ∈ XeqN represent the equivalence relation
x∼ on N . Then, x ∈ Cond (XeqN , µ)
if and only if: [i]
x∼ ⊆ tr(xµ), and [ii] if not a x∼ b, then there exist a′, b′ ∈ N such
that a
x∼ a′ (or a = a′), b x∼ b′ (or b = b′), and {a′, b′} is not an edge of xµ.
(b) The issue (a, b) ∈ [1...K] is determinate if and only if xµ(a,b) = 0 and tr(xµ)(a,b) =
0, or xµ(a,b) = 1 and tr(x
µ)(c,d) = x
µ
(c,d) = 1 for all edges (c, d) ∈ [1...K] belonging to
the same connected component of xµ as (a, b).
(c) The profile µ is globally indeterminate if and only if xµ is connected but not
complete. (Such profiles exist.)
Proposition 3.4(c) is illustrated in the case of N = 3 in Fig. 3. The top graph is the
majority graph xµ of the profile µ that puts equal popular weight to the following three
equivalence relations, represented by their corresponding partitions of {a, b, c}, respectively:
x1 corresponding to {{a, b, c}}, x2 corresponding to {{a, b}, {c}}, and x3 corresponding
{{b}, {a, c}}. The Condorcet set is given by {x1,x2,x3} (see the three graphs at the

























Figure 3: Global indeterminacy in the classification problem
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3.3 Committee selection
For any x ∈ {0, 1}K , let ‖x‖ := #{k ∈ [1...K] ; xk = 1}. Let 0 ≤ I ≤ J ≤ K, and define
XcomI,J ;K :=
{
x ∈ {0, 1}K ; I ≤ ‖x‖ ≤ J
}
. (6)
Heuristically, [1...K] is a set of K ‘candidates’, and XcomI,J ;K is the set of all ‘committees’
comprised of at least I and at most J of these candidates.18 The characterization of the
Condorcet set in this case follows immediately from Lemma 1.5:




} be the set of all candidates receiving majority support.
(a) If I ≤ |M | ≤ J , then Cond
(
XcomI,J ;K , µ
)
= {1M}.
(b) If |M | < I, then Cond
(
XcomI,J ;K , µ
)
= {1H ; M ⊂ H ⊆ [1...K], and |H| = I}.
(c) If |M | > J , then Cond
(
XcomI,J ;K , µ
)
= {1H ; H ⊂M and |H| = J}.
Next, we study indeterminacy in the committee selection problem. The set of (in)de-
terminate issues given any profile µ is easily determined using Proposition 3.5. In contrast
to the preference aggregation and classification problems, the results concerning global
indeterminacy are multifaceted in the committee selection problem. While global indeter-
minacy again occurs often, it does not occur always.
Proposition 3.6 Consider XcomI,J ;K and suppose that I > 0 and J < K. Then X
com
I,J ;K is
globally indeterminate unless I = J = K/2.
The restriction to the case I > 0 and J < K is essential for the conclusion of Proposition
3.6. Indeed, otherwise the committee selection problem displays the following property of
‘comprehensiveness’ which leads to significantly different results. For any x,y ∈ {0, 1}K ,
write x ≤ y if xk ≤ yk for all k ∈ [1...K]. A subset X ⊂ {0, 1}K is comprehensive if, for
any x,y ∈ {0, 1}K , if x ∈ X and x ≤ y, then also y ∈ {0, 1}K also. Thus, a space is
comprehensive if any view affirming a larger set of propositions than some feasible view is
feasible as well. For example, XcomI,K;K is comprehensive, for any I ≤ K.19
In the following result, a space X is called non-degenerate if, for every k ∈ [1...K], there
is some critical fragment w of order at least 3 such that k ∈ supp (w). For example, the
space XcomK−1,K;K is degenerate since all critical fragments have order 2.
20
Proposition 3.7 Let X be comprehensive and non-degenerate. Then X is globally inde-
terminate if and only if 0 ∈ Maj(X).
18The committee selection problem has a long history in social choice theory; according to McLean
(1990) the aggregation problem corresponding to Xcom7,7;20 was studied by Ramon Lull already in the year
1274 in his ‘Book of the Gentile and the Three Wise Men.’ For a related model interpreted in terms of
‘community standards,’ see Miller (2009).
19Likewise, the spaces Xcom0,J;K for 0 ≤ J ≤ K are isomorphic to comprehensive problems.
20It follows from the analysis in §2 above that degenerate spaces are never globally indeterminate.
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To illustrate, consider the class of comprehensive committee selection problems XcomI,K;K .
Here, Proposition 3.7 yields the following corollary.
Corollary 3.8 Let I > 0. The space XcomI,K;K is globally indeterminate if and only if I <
K/2.
To verify this, simply observe that 0 ∈ Maj(XcomI,K;K) only if I < K/2; indeed, if every
voter approves of more than half of the candidates, then at least one candidate must receive
a majority of votes.
3.4 Resource allocation
In this subsection, we show how the general judgement aggregation framework allows one
to represent and analyze resource allocation problems. While global indeterminacy can
also arise in this context, the indeterminacy turns out to be much more ‘well-behaved’
than in the cases of preference aggregation or classification.
Fix M,Q ∈ N, and consider the Q-dimensional ‘discrete cube’ [0...M ]Q. Each element
x ∈ [1...M ]Q can be represented by a point Φ(x) := x̃ ∈ {0, 1}Q×M defined as follows:
for all (q,m) ∈ [1...Q]× [1...M ], x̃(q,m) :=
{
1 if xq ≥ m;
0 if xq < m.
(7)
For example, Φ(0Q) = 0Q×M and Φ(1Q) = 1Q×M . This defines an injection Φ : [0...M ]Q
−→ {0, 1}Q×M . Any subset of P ⊆ [0...M ]Q can thereby be represented as a subset
X := Φ(P ) ⊆ {0, 1}Q×M . Judgement aggregation over X thus represents social choice over
a Q-dimensional ‘policy space’, where each voter’s position represents her ideal point in
P , the set of feasible policies. This framework is especially useful for resource allocation
problems, as we now illustrate. Let
4QM :=
{






and X∆M,Q := Φ[4
Q
M ] ⊆ {0, 1}Q×M .
(8)
Geometrically, 4QM is a ‘discrete simplex’; points in 4
Q
M represent all ways of allocating
M indivisible dollars among Q public goods. Thus, judgement aggregation over X∆M,Q
describes a group which decides how to allocate a budget of M dollars to Q public goods
by voting ‘yea’ or ‘nay’ to propositions of the form ‘xq should be at least m dollars’ for
each q ∈ [1...Q] and m ∈ [1...M ]. We will thus henceforth refer to spaces of the form X∆M,Q
as budget spaces, cf. Lindner et al. (2010).
On the space X∆M,Q, the Condorcet set allows for the following explicit characterization.
For each q ∈ [1...Q] and every µ ∈ ∆∗(X∆M,Q), let m∗q := medq(µ) denote the median in
coordinate q (that is: m∗q is the unique m ∈ [0 . . .M ] such that µ(xq,m) > 12 > µ(xq,m+1)};
as already noted this value exists because µ ∈ ∆∗(X∆M,Q)). It follows that Maj(µ) =
Φ(m∗1, . . . ,m
∗






− M be the ‘majority
deficit’ corresponding to the profile µ. Note that the majority deficit can be positive or
negative.
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Proposition 3.9 Let M,Q ∈ N, and let µ ∈ ∆∗(X∆M,Q).













for all q ∈ [1 . . . Q]}.










for all q ∈ [1 . . . Q]}.









Thus, a profile µ is majority determinate if and only if D(µ) = 0. Moreover, if there is
positive (negative) deficit, the Condorcet set arises by allocating at most (at least) the
median amount to each claimant while distributing the slack in any feasible way.
Note that, if Q = 2, the spaces X∆M,Q have the structure of a line, in particular X
∆
M,Q is
a median space in this case, hence majority determinate. The following result characterizes
global indeterminacy in the spaces X∆M,Q if Q ≥ 3 and describes the qualitative structure of
indeterminacy in these spaces in general. For any profile µ define the degree of indeterminacy
ind(µ) as the number of indeterminate issues given µ, i.e.
ind(µ) := #Indet(µ).
Proposition 3.10 Consider a budget space X∆M,Q and suppose that Q ≥ 3.
(a) A profile µ is globally indeterminate if and only if m∗q = 0 for all q ∈ [1 . . . Q].
(b) For all profiles µ, ind(µ) ≤ Q · |D(µ)|.
Note that, if Q ≥ 3, m∗q(µ) = 0 for all q ∈ [1...Q] can easily occur; for instance, this
will be the case if there are sufficiently many voters and every voter is only interested in
positive quantities of less than half of the goods q ∈ [1...Q] (provided that the relevant sets
of goods differ across voters). By Proposition 3.10(a), global indeterminacy can thus arise
in nondegenerate cases in the resource allocation problem (if Q ≥ 3). On the other hand,
Proposition 3.10(b) shows that typical profiles lead to ‘local’ but not global indeterminacy.
In particular, the indeterminacy will not be global whenever every agent’s ideal allocation
involves a positive amount of more than half of the goods, as stated by the following result.
Corollary 3.11 Consider a budget space X∆M,Q and suppose that µ ∈ ∆∗(X∆M,Q) is such
that every agent’s allocation involves a positive quantity of more than half of the goods.
Then, Maj(µ) 6= 0; in particular, by Proposition 3.10(a), µ is not globally indeterminate.
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4 When Does Majority Voting Lead to Chaos? The
‘McKelvey’ Criterion
Consider again the majority tournament shown in Fig. 2 above. As we have seen, any profile
that induces this majority tournament is globally indeterminate. On the other hand, the
displayed majority tournament is ‘nearly’ consistent: one only needs to reverse the binary
comparison between a and b to obtain the consistent (transitive) ordering b  c  d 
a. This demonstrates that just a little inconsistency can cause global indeterminacy in
the preference aggregation problem, an observation strongly reminiscent of McKelvey’s
classical ‘chaos’ theorem in a spatial context, see McKelvey (1979).
Similarly, consider a graph x ∈ {0, 1}K that partitions the set [1...N ] into two cliques
A1 and A2 and that contains exactly one additional edge connecting some a ∈ A1 with
some b ∈ A2. By Proposition 3.4(c), any profile in ∆∗(XeqN ) that induces x as the issue-
wise majority judgement is globally indeterminate. But as above, among all elements in
{0, 1}K \ XeqN , x is as close as possible to X
eq
N in the sense that the value in only one
issue has to be reversed in order to obtain an equivalence relation (by removing the edge
(a, b)). Thus, also in the classification problem a little inconsistency can cause global
indeterminacy. This motivates the following definitions.
For any judgement aggregation space X ⊆ {0, 1}K and any y ∈ {0, 1}K define the




Also, for any profile µ, let




Say that an aggregation space X is McKelvey if there exists a globally indeterminate profile
µ ∈ ∆∗(X) such that inc(µ) = 1. Thus, a space is McKelvey if there exists a globally
indeterminate profile such that its corresponding issue-wise majority view is only minimally
inconsistent. Any feasible view x ∈ X that verifies the McKelvey property, i.e. that
satisfies dH [x,Maj(µ)] = 1 for some globally indeterminate profile µ, will be referred to as
a McKelvey view.
Theorem 2.2(a) entails the following straighforward characterization of McKelvey spaces.
Corollary 4.1 A space X ⊆ {0, 1}K is McKelvey if and only if there exists a profile µ
such that Maj(µ) ∈ Crit(X) ∩X ′ where
X ′ :=
{
y ∈ {0, 1}K \X ; min
x∈X
dH(y, x) = 1
}
.
21In the context of preference aggregation, this ‘inconsistency measure’ was first proposed by Slater
(1961). As pointed out by (Laslier, 1997, p.68), Slater was in fact more interested in the measure itself
than in the now called ‘Slater rule’ that selects, for any profile µ, the minimizers in X of inc[Maj(µ)]
(cf. Footnote 10 above).
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Above, we have seen that the preference aggregation problem is McKelvey. In fact,
in the preference aggregation example every feasible view is a McKelvey view. To see
this, take any preference ordering ∈ XprN , say with a1  a2  ...  aN , and consider
the tournament x ∈ {0, 1}K that coincides with  except in issue (a1, aN) in which it
specifies a1
x
≺ aN . By construction, we have inc(x) = 1. Moreover, any profile µ such that
x = Maj(µ) is globally indeterminate by Proposition 3.1(c).22
The spaces underlying the classification problem are also McKelvey as shown above.
The McKelvey views are exactly the equivalence relations that partition [1...N ] into two
equivalence classes, see Proposition 4.2(b) below.
By contrast, resource allocation problems are never McKelvey by Proposition 3.10(a).
Moreover, since inc(µ) = |D(µ)| in this case, the degree of indeterminacy of a profile is
proportional to the degree of its inconsistency by Proposition 3.10(b). Resource allocation
problems are thus an interesting example of aggregation problems in which majoritarian
aggregation may be highly indeterminate, yet well-behaved and ‘non-chaotic.’
The extent of potential majority ‘chaos’ can be measured quantitatively by the following
McKelvey index χ(X) of an aggregation space X as the smallest constant C ∈ R such that,
for all profiles µ ∈ ∆∗(X),
ind(µ) ≤ C ·K · inc(µ).
By construction, for any X, one has 0 ≤ χ(X) ≤ 1. At the extremes, one has χ (X) = 1
just in case X is a McKelvey space; on the other hand, χ (X) = 0 just in case X is
majority determinate, i.e. a median space. Budget spaces with at least 3 goods occupy a
middle ground. Indeed, as stated in Proposition 4.2(d) below, one obtains χ (X) = 1
M
for
such spaces; thus, there is a simple quantitative sense in which majoritarian aggregation
in budget spaces is far from chaotic.
The following result summarizes these findings and also shows that the committee
selection problem has the McKelvey property only under restrictive conditions.
Proposition 4.2 (a) (Preference aggregation) For XprN one has
χ(XprN ) = 1,
i.e. the preference aggregation problem is McKelvey. Moreover, any feasible view in
XprN is a McKelvey view.
(b) (Classification) For XeqN one has
χ(XeqN ) = 1,
i.e. the classification problem is McKelvey. Moreover, the McKelvey views are the
equivalence relations that partition [1...N ] into two equivalence classes.
(c) (Committee selection) Consider XcomI,J ;K and assume that K > 2 and I ≤ J . Then
χ(XcomI,J ;K) = 1 ⇐⇒ (I = 1 or J = K − 1) .
22The existence of a profile µ with x = Maj(µ) follows from a classic result by McGarvey (1953), see
also Nehring and Pivato (2011).
22





in particular, the budget spaces X∆M,Q are never McKelvey.
Conclusion
We have proposed a natural and workable demarcation criterion for ‘majoritarian’ social
choice. In particular, we challenged the view that in the absence of a Condorcet winner (or,
more generally, a consistent issue-wise majority view) there is no well-defined ‘will of the
majority.’ Indeed, in spite of the Condorcet paradox it is possible to define a consistent
and generally applicable notion of ‘majoritarianism,’ the Condorcet set. However, this
comes at the price of indeterminacy, since the Condorcet is often ‘large.’ In this paper, we
have analyzed the structure of indeterminacy in some detail, but there remain a number
of interesting open problems.
First, is it possible to refine the notion of Condorcet admissibility using quantitative
information on the majority margins in each issue? This is answered positively in Nehring
and Pivato (2012), by exploring a condition of symmetry across issues.
Secondly, one may ask under what circumstances the path-dependence entailed by
sequential majority voting can even force one to override unanimous consent in some issues.
This problem is addressed in Nehring et al. (2013), where we characterize the aggregation
problems for which sequential majority voting never overrides unanimous consent no matter
in which sequence the decisions are taken (‘strong sequential unanimity consistency’). It
turns out that this is a very restricted class, but we also give examples of interesting
aggregation problems for which there exist particular decision paths along which sequential
majority voting respects unanimous consent at all profiles (‘weak sequential unanimity
consistency’).
Several further questions are worthwhile to address. For example, what is the asymp-
totic behavior of the Condorcet set as the number of issues grows? Or, what is the dis-
tribution over the outcomes of sequential majority voting induced by a given distribution
over the set of possible decisions paths? And what is the induced probability of unanimity
violations? We hope that the present paper will stimulate further research along these or
similar lines.
Appendix: Proofs
Notation. We define the elements 0K := (0, 0, . . . , 0) and 1K := (1, 1, . . . , 1) in {0, 1}K (we
will simply write “0” and “1” when K is clear from context). For any subset J ⊆ [1...K],
let 1J denote the vector x ∈ {0, 1}K such that xj = 1 for all j ∈ J and xk = 0 for all
k ∈ [1...K] \ J .
Proof of Proposition 1.2 First, suppose β ≤ 1 and let µ ∈ ∆∗ (X) be such that µ(x) > 1
2




y∈X [d(·,y)]β · µ(y) must all be elements of supp (µ), thus the global
minimum is by assumption at x.
Conversely, suppose β > 1. Consider a triple x,y, z ∈ X such that y is between x and
z, and assume without loss of generality that x  y and y  z. Let A := d(x,y) and





− ε, for some ε > 0. Thus, PM requires Fβ(µ) = {x}.
However, the objective function
∑
r∈X [d(·, r)]β · µ(r) has the value (
1
2
− ε) · (A+B)β at
x, whereas at y, it has the value
(1
2
+ ε)Aβ + (1
2
− ε)Bβ < (1
2
+ ε) (Aβ +Bβ).
For any β > 1, we have (Aβ + Bβ) < (A+ B)β. Thus, if ε is sufficiently small, we have
(1
2
+ ε) (Aβ +Bβ) < (1
2
− ε) · (A+B)β; thus the minimum value does not occur at x, so
Fβ(µ) 6= {x}, contradicting PM. 2
Proof of Proposition 1.3. It is straightforward to verify that F1 (the median rule) is
Condorcet consistent. We will prove the converse by contrapositive. If β > 1, then
Proposition 1.2 implies that Fβ violates PM; hence it cannot be CC. So, suppose β < 1.
Again, consider a triple x,y, z ∈ X such that y is between x and z, and assume without
loss of generality that x  y and y  z. Let A := d(x,y) and B := d(y, z); thus,
A+B = d(x, z). Let C := Aβ +Bβ − (A+B)β; then C > 0 because β < 1.
Let µ ∈ ∆∗ (X) be such that µ(x) = µ(z) = 1
2
− ε, while µ(y) = 2ε, for some ε > 0. It
is easily checked that Maj(µ) = y. Thus, CC requires Fβ(µ) = {y}.
However, if we define φ(s) :=
∑
r∈X [d(s, r)]
β · µ(r) for all s ∈ X, then φ(x) = µ(y)Aβ +
µ(z) (A+B)β, whereas φ(y) = µ(x)Aβ + µ(z)Bβ = µ(z) (Aβ +Bβ). Thus,
φ(y)− φ(x) = µ(z) (Aβ +Bβ)− µ(y)Aβ − µ(z) (A+B)β








Recall C > 0. Thus, if ε is small enough, then φ(y)−φ(x) > 0, which means φ(y) > φ(x),
which means y 6∈ Fβ(µ), contradicting CC. 2






















k ∈M(x, µ)⇔ k ∈M(y, µ)
)
, (A2)
Thus, µk(xk) ≥ µk(yk) for all k ∈ [1 . . . K], if and only if either (A1) or (A2) applies for
each k ∈ [1 . . . K], if and only if M(x, µ) ⊇M(y, µ). 2
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Proof of Lemma 1.5 (a) is immediate from the definition of Condorcet admissibility,
as is the first part of (b). Now suppose Maj(µ) 6∈ X; it remains only to show that
|Cond (X,µ) | ≥ 3. To see this, note that Maj(µ) 6∈ X only if there is some X-critical
fragment w which is activated by µ. This fragment w must have order 3 or more
(if |w| = 2, then w could not be activated by µ: if each coordinate received majority
support, then a nonzero proportion of voters would endorse both coordinates of w, which
is impossible because w is forbidden).
Now, fix some coordinate j ∈ supp (w), and let wj be the fragment obtained by deleting
coordinate j from w. Let Xj := {x ∈ X ; wj < x}; then Xj is nonempty, because wj is
not forbidden, because x is critical. Let x be an element of Xj such that there exists no
y ∈ Xj with M(x, µ) (M(y, µ).
Claim 1: x ∈ Cond (X,µ).
Proof: Suppose there was some y ∈ X with M(x, µ) (M(y, µ). Then we must have
y 6∈ Xj, which means yj = wj. But supp (w) \ {j} ⊆ M(x, µ) ⊂M(y, µ), so wj < y.
Thus, w < y. But w is forbidden, so this is impossible for any y ∈ X. 3 Claim 1
Thus, we can obtain an element of Cond (X,µ) by contradicting the majority will in any
single coordinate of w; thus, there are at least as many different elements of Cond (X,µ)
as there are coordinates in w —hence |Cond (X,µ) | ≥ |w| ≥ 3. 2
Proof of Proposition 1.7 To show that any weighted additive majority rule Fφ,λ is Condorcet
admissible, take two views x and y such that x agrees with the majority view on a strictly
larger set of issues than y; say x agrees with Maj(µ) on Kx ⊆ [1...K], and y agrees with
Maj(µ) on Ky ⊆ [1...K], with Kx % Ky. If k ∈ Ky, or if k 6∈ Kx, then µk(xk) = µk(yk);
on the other hand, if k ∈ Kx \Ky, then




hence φ[µk(xk) − 12 ] > φ[µk(yk) −
1
2
] by our assumptions on φ. This shows that y does
not maximize the sum on the right hand side of (4), and hence that y is not chosen by
Fφ,λ.
Conversely, let a gain function φ and a view x ∈ Cond (X,µ) be given. Suppose that x
agrees with the majority view in the set Kx ⊆ [1...K] of issues, and let m := |Kx| (note
that m > 0). If m = K, then x agrees with the majority view in all issues and is the




− ε if k ∈ Kx and λk(ε) = mεK−m if k 6∈ Kx. If ε is sufficiently small,
we obtain 0 < λk(ε) < 1 for all k. Moreover, for sufficiently small ε the view x is the
unique maximizer of the right hand side of (4). Indeed, any other view y ∈ Cond (X,µ)
disagrees with the majority view in least one issue k ∈ Kx. Since, for all k 6∈ Kx, λk(ε)
tends to zero, and φ[µk(xk)− 12 ] > 0 for all k ∈ Kx, this shows that y is not chosen by
Fφ,λ(ε) for sufficiently small ε. 2
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Proof of Proposition 1.8. Let z := Maj(µ).
(a) Let γ be a path through [1...K], and let x := F γ(µ). We must show that x ∈
Cond (X,µ). Let y ∈ X, and suppose y is between x and z.
Claim 1: For all t ∈ [1...K], we have xγ(t) = yγ(t).
Proof: (by induction on t) First, xγ(1) = zγ(1) (by definition of F
γ). Thus, yγ(1) = xγ(1)
also (because y is between x and z).
Now, let J := {γ(1), . . . , γ(t − 1)}, and suppose inductively that xJ = yJ ; we will
show that xγ(t) = yγ(t). If xγ(t) = zγ(t), then yγ(t) = xγ(t) (because y is between x and
z). If xγ(t) 6= zγ(t), then this must be because zγ(t) is X-inconsistent with xJ . But then
zγ(t) is also X-inconsistent with yJ (by induction), so we must also have yγ(t) 6= zγ(t)
(because y ∈ X). Thus, yγ(t) = xγ(t). 3 Claim 1
Thus, if y is between z and x, then Claim 1 implies that y is x. Thus, x  z; hence
x ∈ Cond (X,µ), as desired.
(b) Let x ∈ Cond (X,µ); we must find a path γ such that F γ(µ) = x. Let J :=
|M(x, µ)|, and let γ : [1...K]−→[1...K] be a path such that γ[1 . . . J ] =M(x, µ). Thus,
xγ(j) = zγ(j) for all j ∈ [1 . . . J ], while xγ(j) 6= zγ(j) for all j ∈ [J+1 . . . K]. Let y := F γ(µ).
Claim 2: For all t ∈ [1...J ], yγ(t) = xγ(t).
Proof: (by induction on t) First, yγ(1) = zγ(1) by definition of F
γ; hence yγ(1) = xγ(1).
Let t ∈ [1...J ], let I := {γ(1), . . . , γ(t − 1)} and suppose inductively that yI = xI .
Now, xγ(t) is X-consistent with xI (because x ∈ X); hence zγ(t) is X-consistent with
yI (because yI = xI by induction hypothesis, while zγ(t) = xγ(t) by definition of γ and
J). Thus, yγ(t) = zγ(t); hence yγ(t) = xγ(t). 3 Claim 2
Claims 2 implies yJ = xJ ; hence y is between x and z (by definition of J). But y ∈ X
and x  z; thus we must have y = x —in other words, F γ(µ) = x, as desired. 2
Proof of Proposition 1.9. “[i] ⇐⇒ [ii]” follows immediately from Lemma 1.5 and Propo-
sition 1.8. “[ii]⇐⇒ [iii]” follows from (Nehring and Puppe, 2007, Fact 3.4). 2
The proof of Theorem 2.1 is somewhat involved, so it is deferred until the end of the
Appendix.







≺ · · ·
x
≺ aN), and suppose
x
≺ is not a directed Hamiltonian chain in
µ
≺.
Then there exists n ∈ [1...N) such that an
µ
 an+1. Define the ordering
y
≺ by switching
the positions of an and an+1 in
x


















≺ · · ·
y




≺ in every pairwise ordering
except the ordering of {an, an+1}. Thus, M(y, µ) = M(x, µ) ∪ {(an ≺ an+1)}. Thus,






≺ · · ·
µ
≺ aN) be any directed Hamiltonian chain in
µ
≺. Let x ∈ XprN




≺ · · ·
x
≺ aN). Then
M(x, µ) ⊇ {(a1 ≺ a2), (a2 ≺ a3), . . ., (aN−1 ≺ aN)}. Furthermore, for any y ∈ XprN , if
M(y, µ) ⊇ {(a1 ≺ a2), (a2 ≺ a3), . . ., (aN−1 ≺ aN)}, then clearly y = x. Thus,M(x, µ)
is maximal, so x ∈ Cond (XprN , µ).
(b) “⇒” (by contrapositive) Suppose there is some x ∈ Cond (XprN , µ) with a
x
≺ b.




≺ · · ·
x
≺ aN . Then a = ak and
b = al for some k < l. By part (a), the nearest-neighbour orderings in
x
≺ agree with the
orderings specified by
µ




≺ ak+2, · · · , al−1
µ
≺ al = b, i.e.a
µ
∗ b,
which means a 6
µ
∗ b.
Thus, contrapositively, if a
µ
∗ b, then we must have a
x
 b for all x ∈ Cond (XprN , µ).
“⇐” (by contrapositive) Suppose that a
µ
∗ b, and assume without loss of generality
that a 6= b. We will construct x ∈ Cond (XprN , µ) with a
x
≺ b. Let A := {ak, ak+1, · · · , al}




≺ ak+2, · · · , al−1
µ
≺ al.
Consider any path γ that decides the issues (ak, ak+1), (ak+1, ak+2), . . . , (al−1, al) first,
and let x := F γ(µ). By minimality of A, there are no transitivity constraints among





≺ · · ·
x
≺ al = b. Hence, a
x
≺ b by transitivity.
Thus, contrapositively, if a
x
 b for all x ∈ Cond (XprN , µ), then we must have a
µ
∗ b.
(c) Part (b) implies that µ is globally indeterminate if and only if, for all a, b ∈ [1...N ],
neither a
µ
∗ b nor b
µ
∗ a. This is the case if and only if, for all a, b ∈ [1...N ], we have
both b
µ
∗ a and a
µ
∗ b —i.e. there is a directed path from a to b in the majority
tournament, and also a directed path from b to a in the majority tournament. This
statement, in turn, is true if and only if all elements of [1...N ] are part of the same cycle
—i.e. the top cycle of µ encompasses all of [1...N ]. 2
Proof of Proposition 3.4. (a) “⇐=” (by contrapositive) Suppose x 6∈ Cond (XeqN , µ). Thus,
there is some y ∈ XeqN \ {x} with yR(µ)x; thus, Lemma 1.4 implies that M(x, µ) (
M(y, µ). Thus, there exist some a, b ∈ [1 . . . N ] such that (a, b) ∈ M(y, µ) \M(x, µ);
in other words, x(a,b) 6= y(a,b) = xµ(a,b).
First suppose xµ(a,b) = y(a,b) = 0 whereas x(a,b) = 1. Thus, a
x∼ b, but a
y
6∼ b. Now,
let C ⊆ [1 . . . N ] be the x∼-equivalence class containing a and b; we show that C is not
connected in the graph defined by xµ. To see this, let a = c0, c1, c2, . . . , cL = b be any
putative path in C connecting a with b. Then there must exist some ` ∈ [1 . . . L] such
that c`−1
y
6∼ c` (because a
y
6∼ b). But c`−1
x∼ c` (because c0, c1, . . . , cL ∈ C). In other




M(x, µ) 6⊆ M(y, µ)). Thus, (c0, c1, . . . , cL) is not a path in the graph defined by xµ.
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Thus, C is not connected as a subset of the xµ-graph, hence
x∼ 6⊆ tr(xµ), i.e. x violates
condition [i].
Suppose instead that x satisfies condition [i], but that there is some a, b ∈ [1 . . . N ] such
that xµ(a,b) = y(a,b) = 1 whereas x(a,b) = 0. Thus, a
y∼ b, but a
x
6∼ b. Thus, a and b lie
in different
x∼-equivalence classes; call them A and B. Let C be the y∼-equivalence class
which contains both a and b.
Claim 1: A ∪B ⊆ C.
Proof: Since x satisfies condition [i], the
x∼-equivalence class A lies in an xµ-connected
component. Thus, for any c ∈ A, there exists a path a = c0, c1, . . . , cL = c in A
such that xµ(c`−1,c`) = 1 for all ` ∈ [1 . . . L]. And of course, x(c`−1,c`) = 1 (because
c`−1
x∼ c` because they are both in A). Thus, we must have y(c`−1,c`) = 1 (otherwise
M(x, µ) 6⊆ M(y, µ)). Thus c`−1
y∼ c` for all ` ∈ [1 . . . L]. Thus, a
y∼ c by transitivity.
This holds for all c ∈ A, so A ⊆ C. By an identical argument, B ⊆ C. 3 Claim 1
Now, for any a′ ∈ A and b′ ∈ B, we have x(a′,b′) = 0 (because a′
x
6∼ b′) but y(a′,b′) = 1
(because a′
y∼ b′ because a′ ∈ A ⊂ C and b′ ∈ B ⊂ C by Claim 1). Thus, we must have
xµ(a′,b′) = 1 (otherwise M(x, µ) 6⊆ M(y, µ)). Thus, condition [ii] is violated.
“=⇒” (by contrapositive) First suppose x violates condition [i], i.e. x∼ 6⊆ tr(xµ); thus,
there is some equivalence class B ⊆ [1 . . . N ] of x∼ which is not connected in the graph
defined by xµ. Thus, B = C t D, where for all c ∈ C and d ∈ D, we have xµ(c,d) = 0
(whereas x(c,d) = 1). Define y ∈ {0, 1}K to be identical to x, except that y(c,d) := 0 for all
c ∈ C and d ∈ D. Then it is easy to verify that y ∈ XeqN , andM(y, µ) =M(x, µ)t{(c, d);
c ∈ C and d ∈ D}; thus, Lemma 1.4 implies that yR(µ)x, so x 6∈ Cond (XeqN , µ).
Now suppose x violates condition [ii]. Thus, there exist distinct
x∼-equivalence classes
B,C ⊂ [1 . . . N ] such that, for all b ∈ B and c ∈ C, we have xµ(b,c) = 1 (whereas x(b,c) = 0).
Define y ∈ {0, 1}K to be identical to x, except that y(b,c) := 1 for all b ∈ B and c ∈ C.
Then it is easy to verify that y ∈ XeqN , and M(y, µ) = M(x, µ) t {(b, c); b ∈ B and
c ∈ C}; thus, Lemma 1.4 implies that yR(µ)x, so x 6∈ Cond (XeqN , µ).
(b) The second part follows from part (a) in a straightforward manner.
(c) Part (b) implies that µ is globally indeterminate if and only if, for all a, b ∈ [1...N ],
either
(1) xµ(a,b) = 0 but tr(x)
µ
(a,b) = 1, or
(2) xµ(a,b) = 1 but x
µ
(c,d) = 0 for some vertices c and d in the same connected component
as a and b.
“=⇒” (by contrapositive) If xµ was complete, then xµ(a,b) = 1 for all (a, b), so neither
Case (1) nor Case (2) could ever occur. Thus, xµ cannot be complete if there is to be
any indeterminacy.
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On the other hand if xµ was disconnected, then for any a, b ∈ [1...N ] in different con-
nected components, we would have xµ(a,b) = tr(x)
µ
(a,b) = 0, so neither Case (1) nor Case
(2) could ever occur for these points. It follows that for either Case (1) or Case (2) to
ever occur, xµ must be connected, but not complete.
“⇐=” Suppose xµ was connected but not complete. Then there is some c, d ∈ [1...N ]
such that xµ(c,d) = 0. Furthermore, c and d belong to the same connected component
as every other vertex in [1...N ]. Thus, for any a, b ∈ [1...N ] such that xµ(a,b) = 1, we
have an instance of Case (2), so the edge (a, b) is indeterminate. On the other hand, for
any a, b ∈ [1...N ] such that xµ(a,b) = 0, we must still have tr(x)
µ
(a,b) = 1 (because x
µ is
connected), so we get an instance of Case (1), so again the edge (a, b) is indeterminate.
In this way, we see that all edges are indeterminate, so µ is globally indeterminate. 2
Proof of Proposition 3.5. Observe that 1M = Maj(µ).
(a) If I ≤ |M | ≤ J , then 1M ∈ XcomI,J ;K , so Cond
(
XcomI,J ;K , µ
)
= {1M}.
(b) If |M | < I, then 1M 6∈ XcomI,J ;K , and for any G,H ⊆ [1 . . . K] if 1G,1H ∈ XcomI,J ;K ,
then we have 1GM(µ)1H if and only if H ∩ M ⊆ G ∩ M while G \ M ⊆ H \ M .
Thus, 1H ∈ Cond
(
XcomI,J ;K , µ
)
if and only if M ⊂ H and there is no 1G ∈ XcomI,J ;K with
M ⊂ G ⊂ H —in other words, if M ⊂ H and |H| = I.
The proof of (c) is similar to (b). 2
The following lemma will be useful in the proof of Proposition 3.6.
Lemma A.1 Consider the committee selection problem XcomI.J ;K. For all I ≤ J , we have
Crit(XcomI.J ;K) ⊆ {0,1}. Moreover, if I > 0 then 0 ∈ Crit(XcomI,J ;K), and if J < K then
1 ∈ Crit(XcomI,J ;K).
Proof: Evidently, the critical fragments of XcomI,J ;K are given as follows: if I > 0, then all
fragments of exactly K − I + 1 zeros are critical; moreover, if J < K, then all fragments
of exactly J + 1 ones are critical. No other fragments are critical. This implies at once
that 0 ∈ Crit(XcomI,J ;K) if I > 0, and 1 ∈ Crit(XcomI,J ;K) if J < K. Moreover, I ≤ J , so
(K − I + 1) + (J + 1) > K, so no element x ∈ {0, 1}K different from 0 and 1 can be
critical for XcomI,J ;K . 2
Proof of Proposition 3.6. By Lemma A.1, Crit(XcomI.J ;K) = {0,1}. First, assume that
K/2 < J . For each l ∈ [1...K], denote by xl the element of XcomI,J ;K with xlk = 1 for
k = l, l + 1, . . . , l + J (mod K), and xk = 0 otherwise. Evidently, for the profile µ that
assigns weight 1/K to each xl, l ∈ [1...K], one obtains Maj(µ) = 1. Next, assume that
I < K/2; by a completely symmetric argument, one shows that 0 ∈ Maj(XcomI,J ;K) in this
case. Thus, in either case XcomI,J ;K is issue-wise indeterminate by Theorem 2.2(b).
Now assume that J ≤ K/2 ≤ I, which is only possible if K is even and I = J = K/2.





) ∩ {0,1} = ∅ in this case. For instance, suppose
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that Maj(µ) specifies a zero in each of the first K − 1 coordinates, then µ must contain








not issue-wise indeterminate, again by Theorem 2.2(b). 2
Notation A.2. Let J ⊂ [1...K], and let w ∈ {0, 1}J . We define [w] := {x ∈ {0, 1}K ;
w v x}. Thus, w is X-forbidden if and only if X ∩ [w] = ∅. It is sometimes convenient
to express w as an element of {0, 1, ∗}K , where we define wk = ∗ for all k 6∈ J . For
example, suppose J = {i, i + 1, . . . , j} for some i ≤ j ≤ K; then we would write w =
(∗, . . . , ∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
i−1
, wi, wi+1, . . . , wj, ∗, . . . , ∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
K−j
).
Proof of Proposition 3.7. We must show that Crit(X) = {0}.
Claim 1: Let w be any X-critical fragment. Then w is all zeros.
Proof: (by contradiction) Suppose w was not all zeros. By reordering [1...K] if necessary,
suppose that
w = (1, 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
N
, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
M
, ∗, . . . , ∗).
Let w′ = (∗,
N−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, . . . , 1,
M︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, . . . , 0, ∗, . . . , ∗). Then w′ is not X-forbidden (because w is
X-critical). Thus, there exists some x′ ∈ X such that w′ < x. Define x ∈ {0, 1}K by
x1 := 1 and xk := x
′
k for all k ≥ 2. Then x ≥ x′. Thus, x ∈ X because x′ ∈ X and X
is comprehensive. But w < x, and w is X-forbidden. Contradiction. 3 Claim 1
Now, by nondegeneracy, for every k ∈ [1...K] there is some critical fragment wk ∈ W3(X)
such that k ∈ supp (wk). By Claim 1, wk is all zeros. Thus, the fragment {wk}Kk=1 is a
‘critical covering’ of 0, so 0 ∈ Crit(X).
Conversely if x ∈ Crit(X), then we must have x = 0, because Claim 1 says that the
families ‘covering’ x are all zeros. Thus, Crit(X) = {0}. 2
Proof of Corollary 3.8. XcomI,K;K is comprehensive, so we can apply Proposition 3.7.




















Thus, there must exist some k ∈ [1 . . . K] such that µk(1) > 12 , and hence Majk(µ) = 1.
Thus, 0 6∈ Maj(XcomI,K;K); thus, Proposition 3.7 says XcomI,K;K is not globally indeterminate.
“⇐=” Suppose I < K/2. Let µ be a measure which is uniformly distributed on the
set X ′ := {x ∈ {0, 1}K ; |x| = I} (a subset of XcomI,K;K). Then for all k ∈ [1...K],
µk(1) = I/K <
1
2
, so Majk(µ) = 0. Thus, 0 ∈ Maj(XcomI,K;K); thus, Proposition 3.7 says
XcomI,K;K is globally indeterminate. 2
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To prove Proposition 3.9, we need a lemma and some further notation. Recall (footnote
10) that the Slater rule minimizes the Hamming distance to Maj(µ). The next lemma





(This is the metric induced by the `1 norm on RQ). Let ∆([0...M ]Q) be the set of all
probability distributions on [0...M ]Q —that is, all functions ν : [0...M ]Q−→[0, 1] such that∑
m∈[0...M ]Q
ν(m) = 1. For any ν ∈ ∆([0...M ]Q) and all q ∈ [1...Q], we define a nonincreasing
function νq : [0 . . .M+1]−→[0, 1] by
νq(n) :=
∑{
ν(m) ; m = (m1, . . . ,mD) ∈ [0...M ]Q and mq ≥ n
}
, (A3)
for every n ∈ [0...M ], while νq(M + 1) := 0. Let
∆∗([0...M ]Q) :=
{
ν ∈ ∆([0...M ]Q) ; νq(m) 6= 12 , ∀ n ∈ [0...M ] and ∀ q ∈ [1...Q]
}
.
If ν ∈ ∆∗([0...M ]Q), then the median of ν is the (unique) point m∗ ∈ [0...M ]Q such that,
for all q ∈ [1...Q], we have νq(m∗q) > 12 > νq(m
∗
q + 1).
Lemma A.3 Define Φ : [0...M ]Q−→{0, 1}Q×M by equation (7) in §3.4.
(a) Φ is an isometry from the metric d1 on [0...M ]
Q to the Hamming metric on
{0, 1}Q×M . That is: for all x,y ∈ [0...M ]Q, we have dH(Φ(x),Φ(y)) = d1(x,y).
(b) Let P ⊆ [0...M ]Q and let X := Φ[P ] ⊂ {0, 1}Q×M . Let µ ∈ ∆∗ (X). Define
ν ∈ ∆([0...M ]Q) by ν(m) := µ[Φ(m)] for all m ∈ [0...M ]Q. Then ν ∈ ∆∗([0...M ]Q).
If m∗ is the median of ν, then Φ(m∗) = Maj(µ).
(c) Thus, if S is the set of all points in P of minimal d1-distance from m
∗, then
Slater (X,µ) = Φ[S].
For any r > 0, let ♦(m∗, r) :=
{
n ∈ ZQ ; d1(n,m∗) = r
}
be the ‘sphere’ of radius r around
the median m∗ in the d1 metric on ZQ —this will be a polytope with 2Q faces, each of
which is a Q-dimensional simplex. (For example, if Q = 3, then ♦(m∗, r) is a regular
octahedron). In Lemma A.3(c), we have S = P ∩ ♦(m∗, r) for some r ∈ N. If P = 4QM is
the simplex defined in eqn.(8), then typically this intersection will be between P and one
of the two simplicial faces of ♦(m∗, r) which lies parallel to P —see Figure 4.
Proof of Lemma A.3. (a) Let x = (x1, . . . , xD) and y = (y1, . . . , yD) be elements of
[0...M ]Q. Let x̃ := Φ(x) and ỹ := Φ(y) (elements of {0, 1}M×Q). For all q ∈ [1...Q], if
xq < yq, then we have x̃(q,m) = 0 6= 1 = ỹ(q,m) for all m ∈ [xq + 1 . . . yq]. If yq < xq, then
we have ỹ(q,m) = 0 6= 1 = x̃(q,m) for all m ∈ [yq + 1 . . . xq]. Either way, x̃(q,m) = ỹ(q,m)
31
for all other m ∈ [1...M ], so that x̃ and ỹ differ in exactly |xq − yq| of the coordinates
(q, 1), . . . , (q,M). This holds for all q ∈ [1..Q]; hence dH(x̃, ỹ) = |x1 − y1|+ · · ·+ |xD −
yD| = d1(x,y).
(b) Let x := Maj(µ); we must show that x = Φ(m∗). For all q ∈ [1...Q] and n ∈ [1...M ],


























Thus, x(q,n) = Φ(m
∗)(q,n), for all q ∈ [1...Q] and n ∈ [1...M ], as desired.





























= Φ[S], where S is the intersection of 4QM with another, parallel
simplex. Figures (a) and (b) illustrate the case when m∗ is above the simplex. (c) illustrates the case
when m∗ is below the simplex.
Proof of Proposition 3.9. Let m∗ ∈ [0...M ]Q be the median point from Lemma A.3(b);
thus, Φ(m∗) = Maj(µ). Note that 0 ≤ m∗q ≤ M , for all q ∈ [1...Q] (because every
point in X∆M,Q satisfies these constraints). There are three cases: either
Q∑
q=1
m∗q = M , or
Q∑
q=1
m∗q > M , or
Q∑
q=1













m∗q > M , then m
∗ lies ‘above’ the simplex 4QM (as in Figures 4(a,b)). Let O :=
{n ∈ ZQ; nq ≤ m∗q, ∀ q ∈ [1..Q]}. (Heuristically, O is the ‘negative orthant’ with its
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and satisfies the formula in Proposition 3.9(b). However, if R := D(µ) =
Q∑
q=1
m∗q − M ,
then we have S = ♦(m∗, R) ∩ 4QM —in other words, S is the set of points in 4
Q
M
minimizing the d1-distance to m

















m∗q < M , then the argument is similar, except that now m
∗ lies ‘below’ 4QM (as in
Figures 4(c)), so we define O to be the ‘positive’ orthant based at m∗, which we intersect
with 4QM . 2
Proof of Proposition 3.10. (b) follows immediately from Proposition 3.9(b,c).
(a) “=⇒” Suppose µ is globally indeterminate. If D(µ) > 0, then Proposition 3.9(b) says
that µ can only be globally indeterminate if D(µ) ≥M and m∗q = M for all q ∈ [1 . . . Q].
But if m∗q = M for some q ∈ [1 . . . Q], then µ[x] ≥ 12 , where x is the allocation where
all M dollars go to claimant q; thus, m∗p = 0 for all other p ∈ [1 . . . Q] \ {q}. Thus, it is
impossible to have m∗q = M for all q ∈ [1 . . . Q].
So, suppose instead that D(µ) < 0. Then Proposition 3.9(c) says that µ can only be
globally indeterminate if D(µ) ≤ −M and m∗q = 0 for all q ∈ [1 . . . Q].





−M . Thus, Proposition 3.9(c) implies that µ is globally indeterminate. 2
Proof of Corollary 3.11. Suppose µ ∈ ∆∗(X∆M,Q) is such that every agent’s allocation
involves a positive quantity of more than half of the goods. Then for some q ∈ [1 . . . Q],
more than half the agents support allocating at least one dollar to q, so m∗q ≥ 1. Thus,
Proposition 3.10(a) implies that µ is not globally indeterminate. 2
Proof of Proposition 4.2. (a) was already proved in the paragraphs prior to Proposition
4.2.
(b) Let x ∈ {0, 1}K be a graph that partitions the set [1...N ] into two cliques A1 and
A2 and that contains exactly one additional edge connecting some a ∈ A1 with some
b ∈ A2. Clearly, inc(x) = 1 (remove the additional edge, to obtain an element of XeqN
with two equivalence classes). Since XeqN is McGarvey, there exists some µ ∈ ∆(X
eq
N )
such that Maj(µ) = x. Finally, the graph defined by x is connected, but not complete.
Thus, Theorem 2.2(a) and Proposition 3.4(c) imply that µ is globally indeterminate.
(c) “⇐=” Suppose I = 1. Let X ′ := {x ∈ XcomI,J ;K ; |x| = 1}. If µ ∈ ∆∗(XcomI,J ;K) is a




XcomI,J ;K , µ
)
= X ′; thus, µ is globally indeterminate. But inc(0) = 1 because
I = 1; thus, XcomI,J ;K is McKelvey.
The proof when J = K − 1 is very similar.
“=⇒” From Proposition 3.5(b,c), it is clear that µ can only be globally indeterminate
if Maj(µ) = 0 or Maj(µ) = 1. Thus, XcomI,J ;K can only be McKelvey if either inc(0) = 1
or inc(1) = 1. But inc(0) = I and inc(1) = K − J . Thus, XcomI,J ;K can only be McKelvey
if either I = 1 or J = K − 1.






other hand, by part (a) of Proposition 3.10, for globally indeterminate profiles µ, one




Towards the proof of Theorem 2.1
The crux of path-dependence is that earlier precedents can override a majority in a later
decision. An explanation of how this happens requires on a close analysis of the way
that paths interact with critical fragments. Recall that W (X,µ) is the set of X-critical
fragments activated by profile µ. Let w ∈ W (X,µ) and let J := supp (w). If ζ is a path,
and k ∈ J , then we say that ζ focuses w on k if:
(F1) ζ covers every other element of J before reaching k; and
(F2) for all j ∈ J \ {k}, we have F ζj (µ) = wj = Majj(µ); hence
(F3) F ζk (µ) = ¬wk 6= Majk(µ).
The following result is used to prove Theorem 2.1. It characterizes exactly when di-
achronic aggregation violates a majority in a particular coordinate.
Proposition A.4 Let X ⊆ {0, 1}K. Let µ ∈ ∆∗ (X), let k ∈ [1...K], and let ζ be a path
through [1...K]. Then:(




There is some w ∈ W (X,µ) such that ζ focuses w on k
)
.
The “⇐=” direction of Proposition A.4 follows immediately from (F3). The proof of
the “=⇒” direction of Proposition A.4 involves a certain combinatorial construction.
If I, J ⊆ [1...K]; then fragments v ∈ {0, 1}I and w ∈ {0, 1}J are compatible if vk = wk
for all k ∈ I ∩ J (hence, if I ∩ J = ∅, then v and w are always compatible). In this case,
we define v ]w ∈ {0, 1}I∪J by (v ]w)i = vi for all i ∈ I and (v ]w)j = wj for all j ∈ J .
A forbidden tree of height 1 is a pair T := (w, j), where w is a critical fragment (called
the wood of T ) and j ∈ supp (w). We say that j is the root of T .
For any h ≥ 2, we inductively define a forbidden tree of height h to be a system T :=
(w, j; T1, . . . , TN), such that:
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(T1) w is a critical fragment, and j ∈ supp (w). (Here, j is called the root of T , and w
is the trunk of T .)
(T2) For all n ∈ [1...N ], Tn is a forbidden tree of height h− 1 or less, whose root jn is an
element of supp (w) \ {j}.
(T3) For all n ∈ [1...N ], if subtree Tn has trunk wn, then wnjn = ¬wjn .
(T4) For all n ∈ [1...N ], let w̃n be the wood of Tn, and let Jn := supp (w̃n) \ {jn}.
Finally let J0 := J \ {j1, . . . , jn}. Then the subfamilies wJ0 , w̃1J1 , w̃
2
J2
, . . . , w̃NJN are
all compatible. The wood of T is the fragment w̃ := wJ0 ] w̃1J1 ] w̃
2
J2
] · · · ] w̃NJN .
Note: The wood of T includes the root of T , but not the roots of its subtrees T1, . . . , TN .
In contrast, the support of T is defined inductively:




Example A.5 Let K = 36, and identify [1...K] with a 6× 6 grid as shown in Figure 5(A).
Let J1 := {1, 2, 3} and suppose w1 := (0, 0, 0) ∈ {0, 1}J1 is critical [see Figure 5(B)]. Then
T1 := (w
1, 2) is a forbidden tree of height 1 [see Figure 5(C)]. Let J2 := {2, 8, 14, 20, 26, 32}
and suppose w2 := (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) ∈ {0, 1}J2 is critical [see Figure 5(D)]. Then T2 :=
(w2, 26;T1) is a forbidden tree of height 2 [see Figure 5(E)]. Let J3 := {25, 26, 27, 28, 29} and
suppose w3 := (0, 0, 0, 0, 0) ∈ {0, 1}J3 is critical [see Figure 5(F)]. Then T3 := (w3, 28;T2)
is a forbidden tree of height 3 [see Figure 5(G)]. Let J4 := {14, 15, 16, 17, 18} and suppose
w4 := (1, 0, 0, 0, 0) ∈ {0, 1}J4 is critical [see Figure 5(H)]. Then T4 := (w4, 16) is a forbidden
tree of height 1 [see Figure 5(I)]. Finally, let J5 := {16, 22, 28, 34} and suppose w5 :=
(1, 1, 1, 1) ∈ {0, 1}J5 is critical [see Figure 5(J)]. Then T5 := (w5, 34;T3, T4) is a forbidden
tree of height 4, shown in Figure 5(K). A ‘schematic’ of T5 is shown in Figure 5(L).
Observe that two ‘branches’ of T5 overlap in coordinate 14, but they are compatible because
w214 = 1 = w
4
14; this is the significance of condition (T4). The support of T5 is all entries
in Figure 5(K) containing ‘0’, ‘1’, or ‘*’. The wood of T5 is all entries in Figure 5(K)
containing a ‘0’ or a ‘1’ (but not a ‘*’). ♦
For any µ ∈ ∆∗ (X), we say that µ activates the tree T if µ activates the wood of T .
Lemma A.6 Let X ⊆ {0, 1}K.
(a) Let w̃ be the wood of a forbidden tree. Then w̃ is itself a forbidden fragment for
X.
(b) Let µ ∈ ∆∗ (X), let k ∈ [1...K], and let ζ be a path such that F ζk (µ) 6= Majk(µ).
Then k is the root of a forbidden tree T activated by µ, such that:
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Figure 5: Construction of forbidden trees. Boxes labelled ‘0’ or ‘1’ are part of the wood of the tree.
Boxes labelled ‘∗’ are in the support of the tree, but not its wood. The shaded boxes are the roots of the
trees. See Example A.5 for explanation.
(b2) if w̃ is the wood of T , then for all j ∈ supp (w̃)\{k} we have F ζj (µ) = Majj(µ) =
w̃j.
Proof: (a) (by induction on height) If T is a tree of height 1, then T := (w, j), and its
wood is the forbidden fragment w by definition.
Now let h ≥ 2 and inductively suppose the claim is true for all trees of height less
than h. Let T := (w, j, T1, . . . , TN) be a forbidden tree of height h, with wood w̃ and
let J̃ = supp (w̃). Let x ∈ X, and suppose (by contradiction) that xJ̃ = w̃. Let
J := supp (w). For all n ∈ [1...N ], let forbidden tree Tn have root jn ∈ J .
Claim 1: (a) For all n ∈ [1...N ], we have xjn = wjn .
(b) Also, xJ\{j1,...,jN} = wJ\{j1,...,jN}.









because xJ̃ = w̃ by hypothesis. But Jn∩ J̃ = Jn\{jn}, so we have xJn\{jn} = wnJn\{jn}.
We must then have xjn = ¬wnjn , because w
n is a forbidden fragment (by induction
hypothesis). Thus, xjn = wjn , because wjn = ¬wnjn by (T3).
(b) J \ {j1, . . . , jN} = J̃ ∩ J and w̃J̃∩J = wJ̃∩J (by definition of ‘wood’ in (T4)); thus
xJ\{j1,...,jN} = wJ\{j1,...,jN} (because xJ̃ = w̃ by hypothesis). 3 Claim 1
Claim 1 implies that xJ = w. But w is a forbidden fragment (by (T1)). Contradiction.
Thus, for all x ∈ X we must have xJ̃ 6= w̃; hence w̃ is a forbidden fragment, as desired.
(b) Suppose k = γ(t) for some t ∈ [1...K]. If F ζk (µ) 6= Majk(µ), then we must have
t ≥ 2. We will prove the claim by induction on t.
Base case. If t = 2, then let J := {ζ(1), ζ(2)} and w := MajJ(µ); then w must be a
critical fragment, so (w, k) is a forbidden tree of height 1.
Induction. If t ≥ 3, and F ζk (µ) 6= Majk(µ), then there must exist some subset J ⊆
{ζ(1), . . . , ζ(t)} including k = ζ(t) such that, if we define wk := Majk(µ), and define
wj := F
ζ
j (µ) for all j ∈ J \ {k}, then w ∈ {0, 1}J is a forbidden fragment for X. By
choosing J to be a minimal subset with this property, we can assume w is critical.
Let {j1, . . . , jN} be the set of all elements of J \ {k} such that Majjn(µ) 6= wjn . By
induction hypothesis, each jn is the root of a µ-activated forbidden tree Tn such that
(b1′) ζ covers every other element of supp (Tn) before reaching jn; and
(b2′) if wn is the wood of Tn and Jn := supp (w
n), then for all j ∈ Jn \ {jn}, we have
F ζj (µ) = Majj(µ) = w
n
j .
Let T := (w, k; T1, . . . , TN); we claim T is a forbidden tree. (T1) is true because w
is a critical fragment by construction. (T2) is true by definition of T1, . . . , Tn. To see
(T3), note for all n ∈ [1...N ] that µ activates wn by hypothesis, so wnjn = Majjn(µ),
whereas wjn 6= Majjn(µ) by definition of {j1, . . . , jN}; thus wnjn = ¬wjn . To see (T4),
observe that the woods of T1, . . . , TN are all compatible because they are all subfamilies
of F ζ(µ), by condition (b2′). Finally, properties (b1) and (b2) follow immediately from
the definitions of J and T , and properties (b1′) and (b2′). 2
Proof of Proposition A.4 “=⇒”. Let µ, k, and ζ by as in the statement of the Proposition.
Lemma A.6(b) says that k is the root of a µ-activated forbidden tree T satisfying (b1)
and (b2). Let w̃ be the wood of T ; then Lemma A.6(a) says that w̃ is itself a forbidden
fragment. Let J̃ := supp (w̃); then k ∈ J̃ , and w̃J̃\{k} is not forbidden, by (b2). Thus,
any forbidden subfragment of w̃ must contain coordinate k. Since J̃ is finite, there exists
some J ⊆ J̃ (with k ∈ J) such that w := w̃J is a minimal forbidden subfragment —i.e. a
critical fragment. At this point, (F1) follows from (b1), (F2) follows from (b2), and (F3)
is true because F ζk (µ) 6= Majk(µ) by hypothesis. 2
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Proof of Theorem 2.1. We first establish two claims.
Claim 1: Indet(µ) = {k ∈ [1...K]; there exists a path γ such that F γk (µ) 6= Majk(µ)}.
Proof: “⊆” Proposition 1.8(b) says that k ∈ Indet(µ) if and only if there are paths γ
and ζ such that F γk (µ) 6= F
ζ
k (µ). Either F
γ
k (µ) = Majk(µ) or F
ζ
k (µ) = Majk(µ). If
F ζk (µ) = Majk(µ), then F
γ
k (µ) 6= Majk(µ).
“⊇” Suppose Majk(µ) = x. If ζ is any path such that ζ(1) = k, then F
ζ
k (µ) = x.
Thus, if γ is some path such that F γk (µ) 6= Majk(µ), then F
γ
k (µ) 6= F
ζ
k (µ); hence
k ∈ Indet(µ). 3 Claim 1
Claim 2: For any w ∈ W (X,µ) and k ∈ supp (w), there is a path focusing w on k.
Proof: Suppose supp (w) = J := {j1, j2, . . . , jN}, where jN = k. Let γ be a path such
that γ(n) = jn for all n ∈ [1...N ], after which γ traverses the rest of [1...K] in some
order (this gives (F1)). For all j ∈ J we have Majj(µ) = wj (because w is activated
by µ, by hypothesis). Thus, we have F γj (µ) = wj for all j ∈ J \ {k} (because wJ\{k} is
not forbidden, because w is critical); this yields (F2). But then F γk (µ) 6= wk, because
w is forbidden in X; this yields (F3). 3 Claim 2
Now let B :=
⋃
w∈W (X,µ)
supp (w). We must show that Indet(µ) = B.
We have Indet(µ) ⊆ B by Claim 1 and Proposition A.4“=⇒”.
To see that Indet(µ) ⊇ B, let w ∈ W (X,µ), and let k ∈ supp (w). Claim 2 says there
is a path γ which focuses w on k. Then Proposition A.4“⇐=” implies that F γk (µ) 6=
Majk(µ); hence Claim 1 says k ∈ Indet(µ). 2
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